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I. Introduction
  Legal academics have long struggled to define the appropriate role a lawyer's 
moral judgment ought to play in client representation. [FN1] In its simplest terms, 
the question is: Must a lawyer be a "hired gun," seeking all lawful objectives 
sought by a client, or may a lawyer act independently to avoid the harm a client's 
actions will cause innocent parties? Following disclosure of lawyer involvement in 
the Savings and Loan, Enron and WorldCom failures, many in society joined those 
scholars calling for greater moral responsibility. [FN2]
  Based on my experience representing clients, teaching law students, and consulting 
to law firms, I conclude that few lawyers employ the academic analysis in their day-
to-day work. Despite the importance and quality of the *416 scholarship on moral 
responsibility, most graduating law students recall only that controversy exists 
over how to behave if a decision is not controlled directly by rules of professional 
conduct or other law. [FN3] They have not, in law school or after, developed a 
workable system to balance a client's lawful desires with their own moral code. 
[FN4] Even the few who work out an acceptable analysis while in law school discover 
in practice unanticipated economic and other workplace pressures to ignore their own 
beliefs. [FN5]
  In this article, I provide an analytical approach consistent with existing law and 
practice that seeks to find a place for an individual lawyer's moral principles. 
Lawyers, particularly new lawyers, need to know just how much discretion they will 
have to follow their consciences. Understanding the limits on one's moral discretion 
will affect the way a lawyer practices and should influence her choice of practice 
environment. Prior to accepting a position, a lawyer should know whether she will be 
comfortable with the prevailing standards of practice.
  I became profoundly aware of the need for an accessible mode of moral analysis 
many years ago while supervising legal services attorneys. A newly hired and gifted 
attorney asked to meet with me. She was defending a single mother with three 
children in a civil child neglect case. The attorney had developed a number of 
creative procedural defenses and wanted my opinion on *417 the merits of each 
theory. I told her the defenses, in my opinion, had a substantial chance of success 
and complimented her on her hard work and creativity.
  However, rather than being pleased with this news, the attorney clearly was 
distressed. She told me she hoped I would find the claims to be without merit 
because she believed, based on the case file and her own factual investigation, that 
the client was an unfit mother. She was convinced that the children would have a 
chance to thrive if removed from the home, and no chance if they remained with their 
mother. Based on her belief that all children have the right to a happy and safe 
childhood, she argued that it was immoral for us to raise the procedural defenses.
  We talked for several more hours about this case. We argued about the proper 
interpretation of the underlying facts and the rules of professional conduct, and 
discussed our respective concepts of morality. My colleague recalled vividly her 
Professional Responsibility teacher telling her that a lawyer could "follow her 
conscience." Unfortunately, she was now unsure how to do this within the bounds of 
the existing client-attorney relationship.
  At the end of our meeting, she deferred to my judgment that the important values 
of due process and family integrity support raising the defenses. Early the next 
week, she presented the issues and won the case; within a month, she left practice 
to work at a nonprofit agency addressing the needs of children.
  At our exit interview, she told me our conversation had convinced her that the 
decision was correct for the case. However, she remained confused about the role her 
values could play in her work as an attorney. Like many new lawyers with whom I have 
worked, she noted that classroom discussions failed to capture the complexities of 
the real world. In practice, the analysis must end with a decision. Do I plead the 
defenses or not? Do I disclose unknown facts that are material in a negotiation? She 
indicated that the profound uncertainty and discomfort she felt in trying to resolve 
this case would haunt her in all cases where her values were in conflict with a 
client's desire for aggressive legal representation.
  Reflecting on this and other similar cases, I conclude that there are at least two 
ways to assist lawyers and law students facing this dilemma. First is the 
presentation of an analytical foundation, grounded in the world of practice, on 
which to structure moral deliberations. In ethical inquiry, there is no simple 
formula for analyzing complex problems. However, it may be helpful to identify the 
points at which and ways in which lawyers may act on moral beliefs, even when not in 
the client's interests.
*418 Second is an analysis of how a lawyer, by altering client counseling and 
better understanding the limits set by other sources of law, might reduce the 
incidence of conflict between client representation and one's own morals. For 
example, counseling clients to view their cases with a long-term perspective might 
help clients to avoid those shortsighted choices that often raise moral dilemmas. 
Also, given the push for greater substantive justice following the Savings and Loan 
scandal, lawmakers-whether legislatures, common law courts, or courts in their 
rulemaking role-have developed causes of action that restrict many client choices 
that an individual lawyer might see as immoral. [FN6] Claims, such as those filed 
under expanding theories of negligent misrepresentation or the Consumer Protection 
Act, should remove certain troubling options from consideration, and thereby 
diminish the need for a lawyer to choose between client allegiance and one's own 
morals.
  This article explores the academic debate over the proper role for a lawyer's 
moral beliefs in client representation (Section II), proposes a four-step approach 
to resolving the tension between client desires and a lawyer's moral beliefs in a 
manner consistent with existing law and practice (Section III), and provides an in-
depth analysis of this approach (Section IV). Section IV also applies this approach
in the case of a defendant who has not disclosed certain important facts to the 
opposing party prior to settlement of a tort case.
II. Client-Centered Representation v. Contextualism
  There has been a great deal of scholarship on how a lawyer should respond when 
asked by a client to take a lawful action, not barred by the rules of professional 
conduct, that will result in harm to third-parties. [FN7] The debate largely has 
been defined by two opposing positions: client-centered representation and 
contextualism (sometimes referred to by the more descriptive name of moral 
activism). [FN8]
*419 Under the client-centered approach, a lawyer is a client's agent, charged to 
craft legal solutions that satisfy a client's self-defined interests. [FN9] The 
lawyer's moral judgments about lawful options chosen by a client have little, if 
any, role. [FN10] Adherents believe that client autonomy is the key value in 
representation [FN11] and that the lawyer has no special expertise in assessing what 
matters most to the client. [FN12] With respect to moral issues not governed by the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the client-centered lawyer strives to be neutral and 
nonjudgmental. [FN13]
  The client-centered approach is the traditional approach to resolving questions of 
professional ethics when there are no governing rules. [FN14] It traces its 
intellectual foundations to a series of articles written by Professor Murray 
Schwartz. [FN15] Schwartz's underlying principles have been described as follows: 
    First, lawyers act as zealous partisans on behalf of their clients, doing 
everything possibleto obtain their clients' objectives, except to the extent that a 
clear rule of professional conduct or legal principles prohibit the lawyer from 
acting. Under a client-centered philosophy, if doubts exist about the propriety of 
an action, the lawyer is justified in proceeding [the principle of 
professionalism].Second when acting in this professional role, lawyers are not 
legally or morally accountable for their actions [the principle of 
nonaccountability]. [FN16]
  In the child neglect example described above, the client-centered lawyer would 
identify for the client the advantages and disadvantages of raising the defenses and 
abide by the client's choice.
  This approach has been criticized for making lawyers no more than "hired guns" and 
for encouraging clients to consider only a cost-benefit analysis in decision-making. 
[FN17] On a deeper level, critics have charged that allowing a lawyer's conduct to 
be evaluated through his role as a lawyer, rather than by *420 conventional 
morality, is itself morally unsound. [FN18] Some suggest that compelling lawyers to 
act consistent with the client-centered approach has a great deal to do with lawyer 
dissatisfaction. [FN19]
  The contextual or moral activism approach represents the opposite position and 
posits that a lawyer should be an independent actor who asserts control of the moral 
issues that arise during legal representation. [FN20] Contextualists reject the 
notion of role-differentiated ethics and the superiority of client autonomy over 
other moral values. [FN21] Under this view, lawyers should have discretion to take 
actions that they believe to be required by common morality, even if this results in 
"betrayal by the lawyer of the client's projects." [FN22]
  Critics of Contextualism contend that granting lawyers such discretion undervalues 
client autonomy and leads to subjective decisions. [FN23] They point out that 
lawyers often have different socio-economic, ethnic, and racial backgrounds than 
their clients. [FN24] This can lead to inadequate understanding of the client's real 
interests and moral values and the "danger that lawyers will be confident of their 
moral judgments when such confidence is not justified." [FN25]
  Professor William Simon sought to address this concern by anchoring lawyers' 
duties to the concept of justice, rather than to the subjective notions of personal 
morality. [FN26] Simon writes: 
    "Justice" here connotes the basic values of the legal system and subsumes many 
layers of more concrete norms. Decisions about justice are not assertions of 
personal preferences, nor are they applications of ordinary morality. They are legal 
judgments grounded in the methods and sources of *421 authority of the professional 
culture. I use "justice" interchangeably with "legal merit." [FN27] 
    .... 
    The moral basis for the lawyer's decisions are the same principles that underlie 
and legitimate legal judgments generally. A lawyer who limits the distance she will 
go for a client on the basis of norms of legal merit or justice does not deprive the 
client of anything he is entitled to; on the contrary, she simply insists on 
respecting the entitlements of others. [FN28]
  One critic of Simon's approach has argued that such certainty is illusory, and 
that Simon's notion of justice as discerned by the lawyer is "likely to look a lot 
like the lawyer's ideals. There is a danger that Simon's model will cloak the 
lawyer's moral judgment in legal jargon giving it the authority of law." [FN29]
  Under Contextualist theory, the lawyer in the child neglect case described above 
would analyze the case differently. Such a lawyer would decide whether hindering 
protection of the children in need of such assistance would be a moral course for 
individuals in society at large. If not, the lawyer would be authorized to forego 
raising the defenses. [FN30]
  The difference under Professor Simon's theory is that the lawyer would determine 
whether raising the defenses serves justice as defined by the underlying statute. If 
a lawyer operating under this theory concluded that the statutory purpose is to stop 
child neglect, raising procedural defenses that interfered with the valid 
determination would not further substantive justice. [FN31]
*422 In addition to the conceptual issues presented by Contextualism, lawyers face 
three practical dilemmas when trying to employ this theory. First, Contextualist 
scholars have not yet developed a system for implementation. Therefore, law students 
and lawyers are confronted with these powerful ideas without guidance on how they 
play out in the world of practice. One commentator has written: 
    The [Contextual] school has not developed its theory into a step-by-step method 
of client counseling. What does the conversation between lawyer and client look like 
when the lawyer decides that moral concerns should influence the representation? 
Does the lawyer persuade the client to adopt her viewpoint? Does the lawyer threaten 
to withdraw if the client does not agree with her? Or, as William Simon's theory 
might suggest, does the lawyer merely present her conclusions of what justice 
requires as being what the law requires? [FN32]
  Second, Contextualists have not satisfactorily addressed how a lawyer, 
particularly at the early phase of her career, combats the enormous institutional 
pressure to comply with the lawful wishes of a powerful client. Unless the culture 
and norms of most law firms change, refusing to comply with the wishes of a firm's 
largest client will likely end one's chance for advancement and could lead to 
termination. [FN33] This is, to say the least, a challenging step for a new lawyer, 
especially one deeply in debt with educational loans.
  Third, and perhaps most troubling, the call for moral responsibility may be least 
effective for those at whom it is aimed-primarily those representing powerful 
interests. [FN34] There is little evidence that it has affected large firm *423
culture. [FN35] My experience is that the literature more profoundly impacts those 
representing low and middle-income clients. These individuals often are in practice 
settings that are less hierarchical, thus allowing greater discretion for the 
attorney. [FN36]
  For example, my legal services colleague in the child neglect case certainly was 
far freer to act on her beliefs than would be an associate in a large firm. Had she 
not come to see me voluntarily, the decision would have been solely hers. If I am 
correct, Contextualism, contrary its noble intent, could lead to overly 
paternalistic and less effective representation for powerless clients and little 
change in the behavior of those representing powerful clients.
III. Proposed Approach
  In light of the uncertainty in the literature, I offer the following proposed 
approach to representing clients. [FN37] I believe it to be consistent with existing 
law, capable of being used in actual practice, and mindful of the moral issues 
presented in practice. The analysis consists of four steps:
  1. Has the lawyer fully counseled the client about the consequences of the 
decision, including the long-term consequences, and obtained an informed judgment 
from the client on acceptable options?
  2. Is there a Rule of Professional Conduct that either requires the proposed 
choice, bars such a choice, or requires a different choice?
  3. Is there any other source of law that imposes significant barriers or costs to 
such choice?
  4. Does this choice deviate substantially enough from the lawyer's moral 
principles that the lawyer will be materially limited in following the client's 
wishes?
*424 This approach may be subject to criticism for diametrically opposed reasons. 
Those leaning towards Contextualism may wonder if it adequately addresses moral 
questions, since acting on one's moral values is considered only at the end of the 
analysis. [FN38] Client-centered proponents might believe it gives too much credence 
to the role of personal morality in lawyering and, thus, could lead students and 
lawyers towards excessive control of their clients.
  I have found quite the contrary result in my classes and consulting practice. 
Basing discussions on this model has increased both the attention given to the 
client's wishes and the frequency with which my Professional Responsibility students 
and the younger lawyers with whom I worked have raised and addressed moral concerns. 
The early focus on client-centered lawyering techniques and rule-based solutions has 
the lawyer utilize fully their traditional tools. Having exhausted these tools, the 
lawyers and students seem freer, and at times even compelled, to confront the deeper 
moral questions that remain.
IV. Description of the Four Steps
  The first three steps in the process do not address directly moral concerns. 
Rather, they deal with more general principles of client representation and legal 
analysis necessary to frame the options for a client. These steps are important both 
for adequate client counseling and because they may obviate the need to reach moral 
issues. Only if the option selected by the client after these steps presents a 
serious moral question for the lawyer must she consider the more complex and value-
laden fourth step. This section describes each step and evaluates how effective the 
action or source of law is at lessening the moral questions presented in client 
representation.
A. Broad Identification of Appropriate Strategy Choices
  Much has been written generally on client counseling. [FN39] Sources agree that a 
lawyer must determine early on in a case the range of available options to meet the 
situation presented. [FN40] The amount of legal and factual research necessary to 
frame the options will vary according to the experience of the *425 practitioner and 
the complexity and significance of the decision. But there will come a point when 
the lawyer must identify the range of plausible options.
  The question is how broadly the options should be framed and what role the client 
will play in this process. My contention is that a lawyer, in order to best serve 
the client, must approach this task with a long-term perspective and with 
significant client involvement. [FN41] Such an approach will yield a more refined 
definition of success, thereby encouraging better client choices. Decisions 
cognizant of long-term implications tend to present fewer moral dilemmas for the 
lawyer since they focus on deeper interests of clients, rather than on short-term 
gain. [FN42]
  To assess the long-term efficacy of an option, the lawyer must have a clear 
picture of the client's goals for the case or transaction. [FN43] This seemingly 
simple proposition is not without controversy. Many busy, practicing lawyers believe 
the main goal of the client interview is to get legally relevant information, not 
abstract goals. [FN44] Without a clear picture of the long-term goals as defined by 
the client, the lawyer cannot possibly assess the strategies in any meaningful way.
  The debate in the profession on this point centers largely on whether "the 
clients' feelings and priorities should be probed before, during, or after 
discussing alternatives." [FN45] The argument for only discussing client preferences 
in concrete terms is that the client may feel frustrated discussing issues in the 
abstract. Experts in the field, however, have argued that: 
    [P]robing feelings and priorities before you have summarized the alternatives 
and consequences may encourage a more thoughtful self-examination by the client. 
That sequencing of the discussion is more open ended and puts greater pressure on 
the client to articulate feelings and values. Probing first avoids the possibility 
that your client will jump on one of the alternatives without *426 adequate 
deliberation and the subconsciously edit responses to probes to justify the jump. In 
addition, it is the impact on the priorities that changes from one alternative to 
the next, not the priorities. [FN46]
  Given the concerns voiced by many critics of the profession's paternalism,  [FN47] 
adopting a counseling model that requires the lawyer to understand the goals of the 
client from the outset and to explain longer-term implications will enhance client 
relations.
  To illustrate this concept, consider the following example. A defense lawyer in a 
tort case is representing an uninsured client. The client has meager resources, but 
will imminently take possession of significant assets as the beneficiary of a will. 
The defense lawyer is aware that plaintiff's counsel knows of defendant's current 
financial situation, but does not know of the inheritance. There is strong case for 
liability and the plaintiff, who has a family, was severely injured. [FN48]
  In this situation, the defense lawyer, when preparing for settlement discussions, 
should readily be able to determine that she and the client will have to choose 
whether to disclose the inheritance or remain silent. [FN49] This choice will have 
great consequences for the parties and potentially their attorneys. [FN50] Not 
disclosing could result in an unjust and inadequate settlement to the *427
plaintiff. Disclosure will cost the defendant additional funds, something most 
defendants wish to avoid.
  If viewed as primarily a question of what will constitute a "legal" victory, 
usually conceived of as keeping the settlement amount down, the answer to this 
section of the test is easy-remain silent. However, before recommending that option, 
the lawyer will need to do serious analysis of whether such a settlement can be 
successfully attacked and set aside due to the nondisclosure. The legal issue 
presented in such a situation will be discussed in Section IV C. [FN51]
  More importantly, even if the lawyer concludes that the settlement will most 
likely be upheld, there may be reasons why this is not the best option for this 
particular defendant. For example, if the parties are neighbors or have an on-going 
relationship, the short-term benefit of not disclosing may be outweighed by 
reputational damage or loss of future business opportunities. Also, the 
psychological need or general desire of the defendant to put this matter 
conclusively behind him or her, and not to risk the delay caused by the motion to 
set aside the settlement, might be of the greatest value to the defendant. The 
literature on mediation has proven that the lawyer's sole focus on the amount of 
money to be gained or spent and on a "legal win" can interfere with a resolution 
satisfactory to the parties. [FN52]
  By focusing on the broader interests and goals communicated to the lawyer by the 
client, the lawyer is compelled to consider more than the value of winning in the 
legal sense. This first step sets up an analytical process that is client-centered, 
but permits the lawyer to assist in a just resolution by assisting the client to see 
broader interests. [FN53] It also provides a framework from which the lawyer can 
move to the remaining legal issues and, if still necessary, an independent analysis 
of the moral issue.
B. Impact of the Rules of Professional Conduct
  Once the lawyer has successfully arrayed a set of options consistent with the 
client's longer-term goals, the lawyer must assess the feasibility of the *428
options. External factors, beyond the client's preferences, may limit the use of 
these options. I believe the proper place to start in this winnowing process is with 
the lawyer's ethical rules. Starting here has two advantages: 1) From the outset of 
the case, counsel considers the governing ethical principles and the limitation on 
the lawyer's conduct; and 2) The rules, though far from clear in all sections, 
constitute a somewhat defined and limited set of principles. This differs from the 
next step in the analysis, in which the lawyer will have to look to disparate 
sources of law, such as tort, contract, civil procedure, and criminal law, all with 
emerging theories of liability.
  The attorney must determine if any of the identified options run afoul of the 
professional rules governing his conduct. [FN54] Obviously, a lawyer may not, in 
representing a client, take an action that violates the applicable rules without 
running the risk of serious sanctions, including the loss of her license to 
practice. [FN55] For example, in the case of the defendant with the imminent 
inheritance, the defense lawyer could not, without subjecting herself to 
professional discipline, tell the plaintiff's attorney that she has reviewed the 
defendant's financial picture and has concluded it unlikely to change. Such a 
statement would be false and violate Rule 4.1 (a). [FN56] Even if this "option" 
might help get the defendant a more favorable settlement, the Rules of Professional 
Conduct correctly take it off the table.
  Not all questions of professional conduct will be so easily resolved. The more 
complex question in this example is whether the lawyer, without making *429 these 
explicit statements, can complete the negotiations based on the plaintiff's 
incorrect understanding of the defendant's financial situation. To resolve this 
specific question, the lawyer will have to determine whether she may remain silent, 
must remain silent, must reveal the information, or should withdraw from the 
representation. [FN57] By analyzing the approach of the Model Rules to this 
question, we gain understanding of how likely the rules are to help the lawyer reach 
satisfactory resolutions of moral dilemmas.
  I have chosen to analyze a factual situation with no easy answer under the Rules 
of Professional Conduct since my argument is not that the rules resolve all moral 
concerns in lawyering; they certainly do not. Rather, my point is that the rules, 
based as they are on some fundamental norms, will further limit some of the amoral 
or immoral options. [FN58] One must remember that the Rules of Professional Conduct 
were not designed to be a moral code, rather, they seek to strike an appropriate 
balance between justice and the demands of our adversarial legal system, with its 
high regard for client confidentiality. [FN59]
  The hypothetical situation described here is governed by two rules. Model Rule 
4.1(a) provides that a lawyer during representation "shall not knowingly make a 
false statement of material fact or law to a third person." [FN60] Rule 8.4 (c), 
*430 a broad rule governing misconduct whether the lawyer is representing a client 
or not, prohibits "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation." Put simply, the issue presented under either rule will be 
whether silence in this case is tantamount to making a false statement or 
misrepresentation.
  The language of Rule 4.1 (a), which was not changed when the ABA adopted the 
amended rules in 2002, bars only explicit false statements. However, the amended 
comment one makes clear that misrepresentations include "omissions that are the 
equivalent of affirmative false statements." [FN61] Somewhat confusingly, the same 
comment states that "generally [a lawyer representing a client] has no affirmative 
duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts." [FN62] The drafters and courts 
that have interpreted this rule seem to be grappling with how to determine those 
situations where silence is sufficiently deceptive to be the equivalent of a 
misstatement for disciplinary purposes. [FN63]
  Many Rule 4.1 cases that address omissions, rather than false statements or 
partially true statements, arise in settlement negotiations. [FN64] For example, in 
State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Addison, a lawyer was disciplined for 
failing to tell a hospital administrator with whom he was negotiating release of a 
lien that the defendant had an umbrella insurance policy of which the administrator 
was unaware. [FN65] The amount of the release [FN66] indicated that the 
administrator was basing his decision on an erroneous assumption about the likely 
recovery the plaintiff could obtain. In light of this, the judicial referee *431
found that the attorney's act of omission in failing to correct the administrator's 
false impression constituted a violation of Rule 4.1. [FN67]
  Broad cases like Addison, though, do not remove all potential moral issues from 
such cases. The principle that the lawyer need not, and likely under the 
confidentiality rules may not, simply reveal relevant facts unknown to a third party 
cannot be ignored. [FN68] For example, the ABA Ethics Committee found it was not an 
ethical violation to negotiate a settlement in a matter the plaintiff's counsel knew 
to be barred by the statute of limitations. [FN69] The Committee, pointing to Rule 
4.1, approved counsel's decision to negotiate, but cautioned plaintiff's counsel not 
to make any affirmative misrepresentation that the case was not time-barred. [FN70]
  The difficulty in practice is to determine when silence is tantamount to a 
misrepresentation. As these cases illustrate, the answer likely will be very fact 
dependent. Also, disclosure when in doubt will not be an acceptable option. 
Voluntarily disclosing facts gained during the representation that one is not 
required or permitted by the rules or some other source of law to disclose is itself
a violation of the fundamental confidentiality rule. [FN71]
  The court in Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp. [FN72] thoughtfully distilled much of 
the extensive literature and case law on this topic. Judge Grimm wrote the 
following: 
    The above discussed cases and journal articles help to define the problem 
associated with fashioning a workable rule governing attorney conduct during 
settlement negotiations, as well as to suggest its solution. In the end, Professor 
Hazard well may have stated it correctly [when he argued that legal regulation of 
trustworthiness can not go beyond prescribing fraud]. While the duty imposed by Rule 
4.1 [a] may be a narrow one-not to misrepresent knowingly facts or law material to 
the negotiation-it is also an absolute one. [FN73]
*432 If Professor Hazard is correct, as I think he is, that Rule 4.1 merely makes 
a disciplinary offense of conduct that is now considered fraudulent by other law, 
one can legitimately ask if our analysis of the rules has been at all helpful in 
eliminating the moral question in our example. In fact, the January 1980 draft of 
the Model Rules would have been much more restrictive of lawyer's conduct, requiring 
lawyers in negotiation to be "fair in dealings with other participants" and to make 
disclosures to correct "manifest misapprehensions of fact" in certain situations. 
[FN74]
  Does this choice reflect the bar's commitment to "create a world in which lawyers 
are and will remain available to help crooked people cheat others?" [FN75] I do not 
think so. A more plausible explanation is that the law of deceit has developed in a 
way that sets defined and enforceable boundaries on conduct. If that is so, the 
choice to incorporate the law of fraud, without expansion of the term, is not so 
much an abdication of ethical principles as a choice to put a lawyer's license at 
risk for conduct that could also result in other types of sanctions.
  Regardless of how one analyzes this issue, the rule does prohibitcertain conduct. 
A lawyer's focus on and identification of prohibited conduct, at least in some 
situations, will bar the lawyer from assisting in certain actions that will be 
damaging to the general welfare.
  There is one other rule constraining an attorney's ability to remain silent in the 
face of facts on which the other side is relying. Model Rule 8.4 is a broadly 
written rule containing a number of related principles, all which are deemed 
misconduct. Many Professional Responsibility courses overlook this rule, since it 
constitutes such a potpourri of concepts. Despite its lack of popularity in the 
classroom, it has proven to be important in the disciplinary world, since it covers 
conduct outside the confines of the attorney-client relationship. [FN76]
  The key provision of Rule 8.4 for the purposes of this article is Section  (c), 
which provides that it is professional misconduct to "engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." [FN77] Like Rule 4.1, the *433
broad language of the rule covers not only lying, but also certain failures to 
disclose. [FN78]
  "Catch-all" rules such as this are designed to insure that the rules cast a broad 
enough net not to be unnecessarily confined by "technical manipulation." [FN79] 
However, there is also the inverse danger that the rule will fail to give fair 
warning of the conduct prohibited. [FN80] The Restatement states: 
    Tribunals accordingly should be circumspect in avoiding overbroad readings or 
resorting to standards other than those fairly encompassed within the applicable 
code. No lawyer conduct that is made permissible or discretionary under an 
applicable, specific lawyer-code provision constitutes a violation of a more general 
provision so long as the lawyer complied with the specific rule. Further, a specific 
lawyer-code provision that states the elements of an offense should not, in effect, 
be extended beyond its stated terms through supplemental application of a general 
provision to conduct that is similar to but falls outside of the explicitly stated 
grounds for a violation. [FN81]
  The importance of this provision, therefore, lies in its coverage of events 
outside the lawyer-client relationship and not its expansion of what constitutes a 
Rule 4.1 violation, despite its broad use of the term dishonesty.
  The Model Rules define some situations in which silence is not an acceptable 
option. Admittedly, as with many ethical issues, the line may not be as clear or 
broad as some might like. However, the rules as interpreted will eliminate in many 
settings the moral question by removing the option of silence.
  In the example of the defendant with the imminent inheritance, the lawyer must 
consider whether in this situation the rules would be interpreted so that her 
silence will be a disciplinable misrepresentation. If the discussion centered on the 
inability of the defendant to satisfy a large settlement, the lawyer likely could 
not remain silent without running the risk of sanctions. The resolution would be 
different if the dispute in the negotiation was over the damages suffered or 
culpability. Even if the answer to this part of the analysis is that the *434 rules 
do not bar the lawyer from remaining silent, she must still do a significant 
analysis of the other source of law to determine the utility to the client of such a 
course. [FN82]
  In summary, the second step in the analysis is the correct point at which to 
determine whether the rules, as interpreted by the courts and disciplinary 
committees of the state, have resolved the issue. If the rules compel a certain 
step, the lawyer will need to comply under pain of professional sanctions. 
Similarly, if the rules bar a desired course, the lawyer will have to remove this 
option from the array she finally presents to the client. If, however, the rules do 
not bar the identified option or compel a different course of action than those the 
client selected in step one, the lawyer must still consider the viability of the 
option in step three-whether there are other sources of law, such as tort or 
contract, that bar or impose a cost on the option- and step four-whether the lawyer 
can, consistent with her moral beliefs, continue with the representation. It is to 
that part of the analysis to which we now turn.
C. Constraints Imposed on the Lawyer by Other Sources of Law
  Lawyers often do not pay sufficient attention to the impact other sources of law 
have on the utility of client choices. This analysis can be challenging since the 
applicable law is varied, fact dependent, and not codified in one place, as are the 
ethical rules. These external constraints come from common law, statutes, 
regulations, and court rules.
  There are many external sources of law directly impacting the client that should 
be raised in Step 1 as part of the client's long-term assessment of options. For 
example, a favorable settlement with significant prospect of being set aside for 
failure to disclose material facts may not be the best long-term option for the 
client. [FN83] Similarly, if the client will be exposed to a substantial risk of 
civil or criminal liability by adopting what may be the most aggressive strategy, 
the value and feasibility of the strategic choice are dramatically *435 lessened, if 
not eliminated. [FN84] Failing to disclose information when asked or destroying 
damaging evidence may seem in a client's short-term interest, but if it leads to 
monetary sanctions, unfavorable jury instructions, or criminal charges, the 
consequences to the client are dramatic and should eliminate this strategy as a 
potential option. [FN85]
  In this section, I will focus on theories of liability that directly constrain the 
lawyer, rather than the client. The key question is whether these sources of law are 
likely to act as significant barriers to proposed actions that might otherwise be 
deemed to present significant moral choices. A related question is whether courts, 
legislatures, and administrative agencies, which are not a part of the organized 
bar, are more likely to establish norms that satisfy common notions of morality than 
do the ABA's Model Rules. [FN86] I will evaluate these questions by looking at three 
different sources of law in this section: the common law of negligent and fraudulent 
misrepresentation, application of a state legislature's Consumer Protection Act, and 
the use by the courts of sanctions for discovery abuses.
1. Negligent and Fraudulent Misrepresentation
  Courts could lessen controversial lawyer behavior by imposing liability on lawyers 
for all negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations. This, however, is not the 
current state of the common law. [FN87] There are substantial doctrinal differences 
between a lawyer's liability for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent 
misrepresentation.
  The need to protect the lawyer-client relationship from unwarranted outside 
interference forms the basis of these differences. [FN88] If the lawyer acts *436
fraudulently there is not the same potential for interference with the lawyer-client 
relationship that can be created by imposing a duty to avoid negligent conduct 
toward a nonclient. [FN89] Liability in fraud situations is, therefore, much 
clearer. [FN90]
  In addressing negligent misrepresentation claims, the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers identifies the situations in which a lawyer owes a duty of care to 
a nonclient and explains the rationale for such limited liability as follows: 
    Lawyers regularly act in disputes and transactions involving nonclients who will 
foreseeably be harmed by inappropriate acts of lawyers. Holding lawyers liable for 
such harm is sometimes warranted. Yet it is often difficult to distinguish between 
harm resulting from inappropriate lawyer conduct on the one hand and, on the other 
hand, detriment to a nonclient resulting from a lawyer's fulfilling the proper 
function of helping clients through lawful means. Making lawyers liable to 
nonclients, moreover, could tend to discourage lawyers from vigorous representation. 
Hence, a duty of care to nonclients arises only inlimited circumstances[and] must be 
applied in light of those conflicting concerns. [FN91]
  The barrier to recovery is particularly strong in cases involving opposing parties 
in litigation or persons in arm's-length business transactions. [FN92]
  The Restatement identifies four instances in which a lawyer owes a duty of care to 
a nonclient. [FN93] Though further defined by the text of the Section, the general 
categories identified are: 1) Dealings with a prospective client; 2) Situations in 
which a lawyer invites the nonclient to rely on the lawyer's opinion; 3) Matters in 
which the primary objective of the representation is to benefit the nonclient; and 
4) Cases involving fiduciaries who intend to or have breached their fiduciary 
duties. [FN94] Though these categories are somewhat limited, the cases decided under 
this theory do develop significant constraints on lawyer conduct.
  The most important of these categories for purposes of this article is the duty 
imposed when a lawyer, or the client with the lawyer's acquiescence, *437 invites a 
nonclient to rely on the lawyer's opinion or other legal services. [FN95] Allowing 
recovery for negligence to a nonclient who was encouraged by a lawyer to rely on her 
work is certainly fair. Also since the client presumably benefits from this action, 
there is less danger that the lawyer's obligation to use care in accomplishing the 
task will create a conflict with the lawyer's duty to the client.
  For example, in Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, [FN96] a lawyer for a borrower was held 
liable to the lender for negligently furnishing a letter stating that the machinery 
had no liens against it. The lawyer had not searched the records and had relied 
solely on the word of his client, who was a relative of the lawyer, that the 
machinery was not encumbered. [FN97] When the borrower was unable to repay the loan 
and the collateral provided no protection, the jury awarded the lender over $800,000 
from the lawyer. [FN98]
  For the reasons described above, the court devoted great care to analyzing whether 
liability in this case would undercut the attorney's duty of loyalty to his client. 
Judge Posner wrote that "merely labeling a suit as one for negligent 
misrepresentation rather than professional negligence will not make the problem of 
indefinite and perhaps excessive liability go away." [FN99] However, as have the 
majority of courts when faced with this question, the court found a duty of care to 
the nonclient based on the lawyer's actions of providing the information for the 
guidance of a discrete group. [FN100]
  Recognition of limited negligent misrepresentation claims will not eliminate 
deceptive actions by attorneys. Nonetheless, expansion of lawyer *438 liability to 
those not in privity with the lawyer will narrow the range of options likely to 
create significant moral problems. [FN101]
  There are no parallel limitations on lawyer liability when the basis is fraudulent 
misrepresentation. The underlying principle here is that "[l]awyers are subject to 
the general law." [FN102] Under this legal theory, lawyers have been held liable to 
clients [FN103] as well as nonclients. [FN104]
  For example, in Jeska v. Mulhall, the buyers sued the seller's lawyer for stating 
that the property was "a lot of property for the money" knowing that the seller had 
no transferable interest. [FN105] The appeals court reversed the dismissal of the 
action and rejected the lawyer's claims that this was a nonactionable statement of 
opinion. [FN106] The court quoted liberally from Holland v. Lentz, [FN107] which 
stated: 
    [S]tatements of opinion regarding quality, value or the like, may be considered 
as misrepresentations of fact where the parties are not on equal footing and do not 
have equal knowledge or means of knowledge To whom, with what knowledge and in what 
context a defendant makes a statement bears on whether a statement of opinion is a 
"mere opinion of value" or an actionable "misrepresentation of fact." [FN108]
  This cause of action also puts constraints on the efforts of lawyers to use 
partial truth. The Restatement (Second) of Torts makes clear that a "representation 
stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or believes to be 
materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or qualifying 
matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation." [FN109]
*439 I do not wish to overstate the power of these causes of action or suggest 
that they will eliminate all troubling lawyer behavior. In fact, one could argue 
that since the Model Rules have incorporated the test for fraud to determine if 
there is a Rule 4.1 violation, [FN110] the availability of civil relief adds little 
protection for third parties. However, I think this misses a key point. The courts 
have expanded the liability of lawyers for misleading conduct beyond that provided 
in professional rules. The limits on the negligent misrepresentation claims, though 
substantial, have a principled basis.
  Given the overworked nature of most lawyer disciplinary boards, [FN111] the 
ability of nonclients to file civil actions with significant potential damages 
should act as a constraint on lawyer behavior. Also, a young associate in today's 
legal culture suggesting a course of action not in the short-term interest of a 
powerful client would likely prefer to cite liability of the law firm as the basis 
for the suggestion rather than solely one's own sense of morality. [FN112]
  These causes of action establish norms on what type of behavior will not be 
tolerated in legal representation. Perhaps law schools and law firms should devote 
more time to covering these doctrines. If they did, lawyers would have a better 
sense of the exposure they face when treading too close to the line.
  I recognize that this analysis runs the risk of being perceived as too rules based 
with not enough focus on character, which is what some think is needed to change the 
legal culture. However, as Deborah Rhode has written: 
    [A]t least some of the problems involved in Enron and subsequent corporate 
scandals involved a failure to focus on what was legal or on the gaps in what the 
law required. Moreover, good rules can prescribe as well as prohibit; they can 
encourage individuals to behave in a socially defensible ways by framing the 
interests at issue in terms of accepted moral values. Regulation is no *440
substitute for internalized norms, but it can foster their development and reinforce 
their exercise. [FN113]
  Having spent time both in the trenches and in law school classes, I have become an 
incrementalist on issues of this sort. Increased attention to tort exposure can only 
have a salutary impact on lawyer behavior and, in the world of modern practice, will 
bring about at least some protection for innocent third parties. [FN114]
2. Consumer Protection Acts (CPA)
  State consumer protection acts, to the degree that they apply to lawyers, can 
significantly impact a lawyer's conduct. [FN115] Most such statutes bar "unfair and 
deceptive" conduct. [FN116] This standard is far broader than that which constitutes 
fraud. Also, typically a successful claimant under the act can claim multiple 
damages and attorneys fees. [FN117]
  These laws represent efforts by lawmakers, rather than the organized bar, to 
impose norms reflecting the general public's view of appropriate behavior. However, 
if courts, when interpreting the laws, interfere with coverage of lawyers, the 
statutes will be an ineffective source of regulation.
  Courts are split over whether, and how broadly, these laws apply to lawyers.  
[FN118] A small number of states fully include lawyers in CPA coverage. [FN119] 
Others exclude lawyers, usually reasoning that the CPA is not designed to *441
regulate the "learned professions." [FN120] Predictably, a middle position, one 
covering lawyers only when acting in the business aspects of practice, has emerged. 
[FN121] With its long history of judicial interpretation of the CPA and legislative 
change in response to court decisions, New Hampshire presents an interesting study 
of this controversy.
  New Hampshire's consumer protection statute was adopted in 1970 and provides that 
it shall be unlawful for anyone in the conduct of trade or commerce to use unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices. [FN122] The New Hampshire Supreme Court was presented 
with the question of whether this act covered lawyers in 1986 in Rousseau v. 
Eshleman. [FN123] The specific question presented was whether lawyers were covered 
by the act since the statute exempts from coverage "trade or commerce otherwise 
permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board acting under statutory 
authority." [FN124]
  Attorney Eshleman claimed that since the New Hampshire Supreme Court regulated the 
conduct of lawyers, the CPA did not cover lawyer conduct. [FN125] In a 3-2 decision, 
the majority analyzed the case based on what I believe is an overly simplistic 
analogy. [FN126] The Court reasoned that because doctors and plumbers were 
"presumably" exempt because they are licensed, lawyers, regulated as they are by the 
Supreme Court's Professional Conduct Committee, were exempt from the act's coverage. 
[FN127]
*442 The dissenters disagreed with this broad reading of the exemption clause. 
[FN128] However, they did not urge full CPA coverage for attorneys and suggested 
coverage only for those actions constituting the business of law, such as fee 
setting and advertising. [FN129] They reasoned that applying the CPA's strict 
liability standard to professional judgments would alter the standard for 
malpractice and make a lawyer responsible for any mistake even if based on sound 
research and judgment. [FN130]
  By the time Rousseau returned to the Court on a motion for rehearing, one of the 
judges in the majority had retired. [FN131] The new appointee, Justice Thayer, 
concurred in the refusal to rehear the case, but wrote to show his agreement 
substantively with the dissent. [FN132] Based on this opinion, the Rousseau case's 
exemption of lawyers looked ripe to be overruled.
  However, when the next CPA case, a matter not involving a lawyer, was presented to 
the court, it abandoned the broad exemption for all professionals, but at the same 
time did not overturn the Rousseau case as to attorneys. [FN133] This created a 
situation where the Rousseau case, decided as it was by analogy to the broad 
exemptions presumably enjoyed by other professionals, now stood alone for the 
proposition that only lawyers with their special, court-supervised system of 
regulation were exempt.
  Eight years later, the court was directly confronted with another case involving a 
lawyer. [FN134] The court, rather than harmonizing the law to allow CPA claims 
against lawyers as it had for other professionals, went back and ruled that the 
first Rousseau case was correct and granted again a broad exemption to all regulated 
industries. [FN135] The legislature, which had not amended the law *443 throughout 
this unsettled period, stepped in almost immediately to overrule this last case and 
applied the CPA to lawyers. [FN136]
  The CPA and other similar statutes that outlaw deception and provide enhanced 
damages and attorney fees will alter legal practice by imposing a tangible deterrent 
to dishonest conduct. [FN137] Also, since the legislature reflects views outside 
those of the organized bar, such statutes may be more aggressive and thus better 
able to control questionable lawyer behavior.
  As the New Hampshire cases show, court-created exclusion of lawyers from coverage 
can make such laws irrelevant. Also, even limitations on coverage to the business 
aspects of lawyering may restrict the scope of the law so it does not play a 
meaningful role in the most controversial areas of lawyer conduct. In our example, 
the lack of disclosure of the imminent inheritance, even if "deceptive," would 
likely not be deemed to relate to business aspects of law, such as setting fees and 
advertising. Thus, it would be exempt from CPA coverage in states with such a 
limitation.
  In most states, legislatures can set some limits on lawyer conduct through 
statutes of this sort. [FN138] Such actions by legislatures will engage them in the 
debate about lawyer conduct and could eliminate some troubling lawyer conduct.
3. Court Control of Discovery Abuses
  Much of this article has focused on lawyer conduct during negotiation. Much 
troubling lawyer conduct also occurs in the discovery process. It may be useful, 
therefore, to look at court sanctions for discovery and other litigation abuses. 
This will allow us to look at a different "lawmaker"-courts acting pursuant to their 
rulemaking authority and inherent power to control *444 litigation. [FN139] If 
courts can constrain many of the unacceptable options by imposing a burden on their 
use, these options become less viable.
  Modern discovery rules have gone a long way towards making a trial "less a game of 
blindman's b[l]uff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed 
to the fullest practicable extent." [FN140] Yet as any practitioner knows, the 
system has not reached this aspiration, in part, due to the "gaming" of discovery. 
[FN141]
  A study of discovery abuses found conflicting views on the efficacy of judge 
control of such abuses. [FN142] Professor Robert Nelson held focus groups with large 
firm and plaintiff's lawyers, judges, and in-house counsel as part of the ABA 
Section on Litigation's "Beyond the Rules" project. He wrote: 
    Some of our informants argued that external sanctions imposed by the courts were 
the only effective mechanism for discouraging problematic behavior. Various lawyers 
offered testimonials to instances in which judges threatened, but ultimately did not 
execute, penalties for litigation misconduct. Other lawyers disagreed, citing the 
fact that judges become involved in a tiny fraction of the litigation process and do 
not have the resources to effectively police advocates. [FN143]
  The judges interviewed, while recognizing that abuses clearly existed, felt that 
they could not devote the time necessary to actively manage discovery. [FN144]
  Few would dispute that there are not enough judicial resources to control all 
discovery abuse. However, the imposition of sanctions can and does affect behavior 
by increasing the "cost" of selecting such an option. The cost can be fines payable 
by the attorney and not recoverable from the client, exclusion of evidence, and 
discipline. [FN145] Additionally, the potential of being named in a *445 reported 
opinion critical of one's conduct should limit the options attorneys will consider.
  The plaintiff's lawyers interviewed in Nelson's study pointed out another 
important constraint on discovery abuse. They asserted that it is often more 
advantageous not to seek sanctions, but to "establish a record of delay and 
avoidance by defense lawyers, with the goal of undermining defense credibility 
before the judge." [FN146] The perception by the trial judge that opposing counsel 
is less than honest and is causing delay and extra work for the judge can yield 
significant benefits in contested rulings throughout the case. [FN147] A competent 
lawyer, even if not moved by the moral issues presented, should be able to 
understand the cost of this perception to his client and to himself in future 
proceedings. [FN148]
  The First Circuit demonstrated the consequences for discovery abuses in Klonoski 
v. Mahlab. [FN149] Plaintiff, the decedent's husband, filed a wrongful death action 
and consortium claim based on alleged medical malpractice during childbirth. [FN150] 
Defendant sought to cross-examine the plaintiff at the close of his case with a 
previously undisclosed letter the wife had written to her sister describing problems 
in their marriage. [FN151] If defendant could show that the marriage was failing, 
the jury likely would reduce any damage award.
  According to the defendant's attorney, the letter had been obtained just a few 
days before trial. [FN152] Plaintiff's lawyer objected since this document had not 
been produced despite a request that defendant produce the names of any person known 
to possess information related to "marital discord between Dr. and Mrs. Klonoski." 
[FN153]
  The First Circuit vacated the defendant's verdict based on the trial judge's 
refusal to bar the use of the letter. [FN154] It stated: 
*446 The purpose of the discovery rules is to provide for the "fullest possible" 
pretrial disclosure of admissible evidence to "reduce the possibility of surprise" 
and to "insure a fair contest." As we have discussed, . . . absent some unusual 
extenuating circumstances not present here, the appropriate sanction when a party 
fails to provide certain evidence to the opposing party as required in the discovery 
rule is preclusion of that evidence from the trial. We have recently condemned trial 
by ambush tactics and for this reason vacated a verdict returned for the defendant.
(citations omitted). [FN155]
  The decision, in addition to vacating the judgment employed a harsh, and somewhat 
sarcastic, characterization of the conduct. The Court wrote: 
    We cannot help being impressed by the exquisite timing of the injection of the 
letters into the trial. Dr. Klonoski, the last witness in the plaintiff's case, had 
finished his direct testimony. The plaintiff's case had been completed. Cross-
examination started with some innocuous questions. This was followed by what clearly 
were questions setting up Dr. Klonoski for the introduction of the letters. Whether 
by design or accident, the timing could not have been better for the defendants. 
[FN156]
  This demonstrates another technique courts can use to impose tangible costs to 
control lawyer conduct - that is publicly commenting on the actions of a lawyer. 
Practitioners know that court admonitions are to be avoided and that the short-term 
benefit to a client is not worth the damage to reputation, especially in smaller 
legal communities. [FN157] The danger of such published admonitions should be enough 
to deter much undesirable and unfair lawyer conduct.
*447 D. Moral Judgments
  This article began by asking what role, if any, a lawyer's moral beliefs should 
have in client representation. I have argued that a lawyer should consider acting on 
her own notions of morality only after completion of a broadly framed legal 
analysis. [FN158] Yet there will certainly be situations in which the legal analysis 
does not resolve the moral tension.
  In fact, my first three steps will not necessarily eliminate the moral question 
raised in my example of the tort defendant with the inheritance. The defendant, even 
after full discussion, may see no long-term interest justifying disclosure. If there 
has been no discussion of the defendant's financial situation during settlement 
negotiations, there may be no actionable misrepresentation under either the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or the common law. Also, in a state that has interpreted the 
Consumer Protection Act to cover only the business aspects of law, there will be no 
viable claim. Finally, given the limited scope of prejudgment discovery of a 
defendant's assets, [FN159] defendant would likely have committed no discovery 
violations.
  If the lawyer in my example determined there was no legal need for disclosure, but 
still had moral concerns, she must determine how to proceed. To make such a choice, 
the lawyer must analyze (a) what level of conflict between the proposed action and 
one's moral beliefs calls for further action and (b) what actions by the lawyer are 
appropriate.
  The first step is important because a lawyer may not overrule a competent client 
based simply on his own view of the best way to resolve the situation. Also, if the 
lawyer feels compelled to act based on a conflict between the *448 client's wishes 
and a deeply held moral principle, she should take steps that are no greater than 
necessary to meet the moral concerns. [FN160]
1. Conflict Between Proposed Action and Moral Concerns
  The standard I recommend to determine whether further action is warranted is: Does 
this choice deviate substantially enough from the lawyer's moral principles that the 
lawyer will be materially limited in following the client's wishes? An example of 
this might be a lawyer who due to personal beliefs feels unable to provide 
information that might lead a client to make what the lawyer believes is an immoral 
choice. This leads to a limitation on the lawyer's duty to counsel the client. 
[FN161]
  This approach places more significant constraints on the lawyer's independent 
action than that currently suggested by Contextualists. [FN162] Yet it does
recognize that there may be situations during the representation when such action is 
warranted, a belief at odds with some in the client-centered camp. [FN163]
  Lawyers applying this approach in practice will face at least two problems. The 
first is defining controlling moral values in the context of legal representation. 
[FN164] The second is a more practical problem. How, when underlying facts are 
critical to moral reasoning, can the lawyer be sure his assumptions are more correct 
than the client's position?
*449 As to the issue of identifying the applicable values, this model focuses on 
the conflict between the proposed action and the lawyer's personal values, rather 
than on a conflict with a universally recognized external norm. Such a standard may 
lead some to see the specter of rampant relativism. [FN165] However, I am not 
suggesting that lawyers simply look to their own personal opinion and preferences. 
Rather, I am arguing that lawyers need to engage in the best moral reflection of 
which they are capable.
  This analysis would be simpler if lawyers had an agreed upon hierarchy of values, 
whose application would produce a clear notion of what is ethically preferred 
conduct. Such thinking is sometimes referred to as "moral geometry." [FN166] 
However, there is no consensus on what constitutes morality.
  Bradley Wendel, after carefully surveying the literature on moral theory, 
concluded: 
    Should we prefer the theoretical elegance of a monistic foundation for legal 
ethics? Perhaps some human activities can be rationalized as having one unified end, 
so that participants in the practice could be judged according to whether their 
actions furthered or hindered an agreed-upon goal. The social practice of lawyering, 
however, seems almost uniquely unsuited to this kind of simplification, for lawyers 
are the agents through whom humans construct disputes and dialogue about the basic 
conflicts inherent in social life. Although I do not wish to make too much of this 
observation, which has become somewhat cliched, it nevertheless is the case that 
social life exhibits a fundamental contradiction, which can be represented as the 
opposition between liberty and order; individualism and collective goods; or 
partiality and equality. Any scheme of values, therefore that is to underlie and 
justify *450 the practice of lawyering, is bound to partake of the same internal 
incoherence as the principles of social life upon which it is founded. [FN167]
  Despite the somewhat relativist tone of this observation though, Wendel asserts 
that this "should be a cause for hope, not despair." [FN168] He argues that lawyers 
can make sense of this seeming chaos through moral reasoning and efforts to 
"coalesce around a set of shared values, traditions, and commitments." [FN169] This 
observation suggests that well-intentioned lawyers, guided by their own moral 
compass and the values of the communities in which they live and work, can assess 
moral issues.
  There is another practical reason to support this approach. Many lawyers and law 
students either have not studied in depth the literature on moral discourse or, even 
if trained, have not adopted one of the competing moral theories. Paul Tremblay 
noted: 
    [Proposals for law students to engage in greater study of metaethics and value 
systems] make much good sense, but are blemished by some deep problems. I do not 
pretend to discount the value of exploring the rich philosophical traditions that 
underpin moral discourse. My several concerns run in the opposite direction, and 
actually grow out of the sophistication needed to join these philosophical debates. 
    There exists a serious question whether law students and lawyers have the skill 
and sophistication necessary to understand these theories well enough to make [a 
commitment to one of the competing theories]. Kant in his original texts is 
extraordinarily difficult to understand, and those who offer to make his teachings 
clearer are seldom that much more comprehensible. 
    Even if a lawyer learned a great deal about the intricacies of the two (or more) 
competing theories, she still may not want to "opt in" to one camp in exclusion of 
the other. Sometimes, she might find the Kantian idea of dignity and autonomy far 
more attractive than an opposing choice grounded in consequentialist notions of 
efficiency or best interests. At other times, she might find herself relying on the 
utilitarian idea of using scarce resources *451 efficiently, even if doing so fails 
to afford sufficient respect to individual plights. [FN170]
  Like Wendel, Tremblay does not see this as an insoluble problem. [FN171] He 
proposes that lawyers engage in the deliberative process, known as casuistry, when 
confronted with moral dilemmas. [FN172] This is a "case-based approach in which an 
argument is developed by comparing the case at hand with paradigm cases in which it 
is reasonably clear what course of action should be taken." [FN173]
  This analysis may be particularly useful for lawyers and law students because it 
does not claim to reach certainty in its conclusions. As Tremblay has written: 
    The paradigm cases represent the source of shared sentiments. Most ethical 
dilemmas or quandaries consist of stories or circumstances where multiple, competing 
ethical principles or moral theories seem to apply, and how to rank or prioritize 
the conflicting norms is not readily apparent. In some of these stories and 
circumstances, the dilemma or conflict will be insoluble, for incomparability 
reasons.In those cases, despite the angst experienced by the agent who must proceed 
amidst the uncertainty, there is no available right answer and her actions cannot be 
criticized. Of course, not all dilemmas or conflicts are so insoluble-if they were, 
ethical conversation would have no purpose. Ethical conversation and debate assumes 
that some issues are subject to reasoned analysis. Casuistry offers a coherent, 
practical method for that analysis. It permits the same kind of inductive, analogy-
driven scrutiny that legal scholars employ when using common law precedent to decide 
on a right answer in a difficult legal dispute. Law students perform that process 
regularly in substantive law courses; they might then be shown a similar process in 
ethics contexts. [FN174]
  My own experience in the field of bioethics, an applied ethical discipline, 
suggests that this approach may be very useful to meet the danger of relativism and 
the problem presented by the complexity of formal moral theory identified above. As 
a member of a hospital ethics committee, I have observed intelligent individuals 
from medical and lay backgrounds, often without an agreed upon set of principles, 
reason their way through the thorny ethical dilemmas. This *452 gives me hope that 
lawyers and law students can successfully engage in a similar analysis. [FN175]
  Lawyers in firm meetings or with a trusted colleague or two could engage in much 
the same type of discussion that hospital ethics committees do. In hospitals, the 
health care team, patients, and families use these discussions to resolve complex 
disputes. Similarly, this type of structured thinking could serve the same role in 
law practice.
  Some have argued for a more defined set of standards. Deborah Rhode has rejected 
the notion that lawyers are not bound by common morality and has offered an 
explanation for how a morally reflective lawyer would make ethical decisions. 
[FN176] She argues that "[l]awyers' conduct should be justifiable under consistent, 
disinterested, and generalizable principles.Lawyers also have responsibilities to 
prevent unnecessary harm to third parties, to promote a just and effective legal 
system, and to respect core values such as honesty, fairness, and good faith on 
which that system depends." [FN177] While this offers some guidance, it is clear 
that it does not provide significant analytical parameters to avoid the problem of 
subjectivity associated with much moral reasoning.
  The second problem I identified above is that even if one believes that she can 
find sound and agreed upon moral principles, applying those principles to specific 
cases remains a challenge. Tremblay argues that individuals "tend to have common, 
shared sentiments about the good, andcan reason about the ideal." [FN178] Despite 
this, we as a society disagree on virtually every important moral and political 
issue. He posits that this is because: 
    [W]hen you parse out their disagreement, it is almost invariably about facts, 
not values as such. People who debate complex issues rely on arguments that are 
grounded in assertions about what will happen, what has happened, or what accounts 
for what has happened. You oppose welfare expansion, and support strict workfare, 
because you believe that welfare recipients are lazy, and need incentives to find 
work. I support welfare expansion, and oppose strict workfare, because I believe 
that welfare recipients are oppressed, discriminated against, and need the money to 
survive and raise their children. You never argue that welfare recipients who really 
will die without the *453 money should die. I never argue that lazy people should 
get money so they can sit home and buy vodka. Our values are not so different. Our 
views of the facts are terrifically different. [FN179]
  If Tremblay is correct about this, and I think he is, lawyers must be extremely 
cautious about overriding client wishes. This is not only because lawyers often come 
from different backgrounds than their clients and will not have to live with the 
consequences of the choice, but also because the underlying facts are often at 
issue.
  Factual issues were critical in my discussion with my colleague in the child abuse 
example I used at the beginning of the article. We shared the value that children 
should have the opportunity to thrive. However, based on our experiences, we 
differed on what would best advance the goal. I argued that placing children in our 
current foster care system could produce worse outcomes for the children than were 
likely if they remained in this stable, but somewhat dysfunctional, family. Such 
outcomes include separation of siblings, and frequent changes in placements, which 
results in school change and loss of friends and other community connections.
  We differed also on what conclusions to draw from her client's unkempt house. My 
colleague felt this was solid evidence of parental indifference. I thought the 
failure of the mother to keep the house reasonably clean showed us nothing about the 
mother's attitude towards her children. Rather, this might be the best this 
stressed, working, single mother could do while trying to meet her kids' other 
needs.
  I could not help but reflect on the difference in our life situations. At the time 
of our discussion, I was struggling to adjust to life with my second son, and coping 
with the fatigue and disarray that comes with a new baby. My colleague, in good 
faith and with the best of intentions, was judging family life based on observations 
formed during infrequent visits with her nieces and nephews.
  Despite the difficulty in determining appropriate moral values and interpreting 
underlying facts, there will certainly be situationswarranting action by the lawyer. 
But the strong presumption, once the lawyer undertakes representation, should be 
that the values of client choice and deference to the client's decisions will 
override differences of opinion unless based on clear *454 conflicts with one's own 
strongly held beliefs. [FN180] As Andrew Kaufman has written: 
    And so the occasions on which lawyers may have a real moral choice to make in 
the advice they give may not be so numerous as the protagonists on this issue would 
have us believe.Likewise, there are many other situations where it is perfectly 
appropriate for a lawyer with a strong moral position to recognize that there are 
other reasonable solutions to the moral dilemma and thus to defer to the client's 
differing moral judgment. That kind of deferring has a moral quality to it too. 
[FN181]
  Once a lawyer has decided, even after the appropriate deference to the client, 
that the proposed action so substantially conflicts with his moral principles that 
he will be limited in the representation, the lawyer must still decide what steps 
are available to him. It is to that final step that we now turn.
2. Actions Available to the Lawyer
  A lawyer in an existing client-lawyer relationship [FN182] faced with an option 
that is lawful, selected by the client, and deviates substantially enough from her 
moral principles is presented with a range of choices. Scholars have suggested that 
potential options range from following the client's will [FN183] to "betrayal of 
[the] client's projects." [FN184]
*455 Analyzing the options from the least intrusive on client choice to the most 
challenging, the first issue presented is whether the lawyer should counsel the 
client on moral implications. Under my approach, this is an easy question. It is 
certainly appropriate and, in light of the moral conflict the lawyer may face, 
likely will be necessary to engage in such a conversation. Even under the client-
centered model, which emphasizes taking neutral actions that do not influence 
client's choice, there is little question that the lawyer could raise his concerns 
once he concludes the action is morally wrong. [FN185]
  Advocates of greater client collaboration [FN186] view this analysis as in effect, 
too little and too late. Some have argued: 
  [C]lient -centered counselors' moral discourse comes into play only when the 
lawyer feels the client wants to do something that is "morally wrong." Morality (in 
and out of the law office) is not generally a matter of choosing whether to do 
something that is "morally wrong"; more often it is a choice between something that 
is better and something that is worse. It may not be often that the client will make 
a choice that the lawyer feels is "morally wrong," but clients constantly are faced 
with issues that have moral implications. We feel that those moral implications 
should be considered during the decision-making process. [FN187]
  I, too, believe it is entirely appropriate for the lawyer to raise moral 
considerations with his client. [FN188] The purpose of this article is not to limit 
the discretion the lawyer has to engage in moral discourse; [FN189] rather, I have 
tried to *456 identify an approach for acting on moral issues when the lawyer 
believes this to be warranted.
  A more dramatic option is for the lawyer to inform the client that she will 
withdraw from representation unless the client agrees to a different course of 
action. Actual withdrawal can have substantial consequences for the client, such as 
delay in achieving client goals and the additional expense of hiring new counsel and 
bringing her up to speed. [FN190] Even the threat of withdrawal can have serious 
consequences since the client will often feel compelled or pressured to comply with 
the lawyer's wishes or face the consequences described above. In light of this, 
lawyers who undertake "representation ordinarily should see it through to the 
contemplated end of the lawyer's services." [FN191]
  Despite this policy, which is based in contract and fiduciary law principles, the 
Model Rules allow a lawyer to withdraw in a broad range of circumstances. [FN192] 
There are two primary provisions of the withdrawal rule for a lawyer who has moral 
qualms about a proposed, lawful client action. [FN193] The first is "withdrawal 
[which] can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the 
client." [FN194] The second is withdrawal when "the client insists upon taking 
action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a 
fundamental disagreement." [FN195]
  There likely will be few situations in which there will be no material adverse 
impact on a client. Nonetheless, this is a question of fact. The Restatement offers 
a helpful suggestion for lawyers seeking to withdraw under this section and notes: 
    A lawyer wishing to withdraw can ameliorate those effects [cost of new counsel] 
by assisting the client to obtain successor counsel and foregoing or refunding fees. 
But other material adverse affects might be beyond the withdrawing lawyer's power to 
mitigate. Delay necessitated by the change of counsel might materially prejudice the 
client's matter. An equally qualified *457 lawyer might be unavailable or available 
only at material inconvenience to the client. [FN196]
  Even if the client will suffer harm, the lawyer can still withdraw under the other 
provisions of the rule. [FN197]
  Model Rule 1.16(b)(4) grants a lawyer broad discretion to withdraw when the 
client's actions are inconsistent with the lawyer's moral beliefs. The current 
provision provides that a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if "the 
client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which 
the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement." [FN198] This section was amended in 2001 
and was drafted to narrow the attorney's discretion. [FN199] The prior provision 
permitted withdrawal if "the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the 
lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent." (emphasis added to highlight deleted 
language). [FN200]
  The Reporter's explanation of the changes states that: 
    Allowing a lawyer to withdraw merely because the lawyer believes that the 
client's objectives or intended action is "imprudent" permits the lawyer to threaten 
to withdraw in order to prevail in almost any dispute with a client, thus detracting 
from the client's ability to direct the course of the representation. Nevertheless, 
the Commission believes that a lawyer ought to be permitted to withdraw when the 
disagreement over the objectives or means is so fundamental that the lawyer's 
autonomy is seriously threatened. [FN201]
*458 Despite the narrowing of the language, the current rule authorizes withdrawal 
based on firmly held moral beliefs. [FN202]
  Given the limited standard I have suggested before the lawyer is to act on his 
moral beliefs, there may be a more fundamental reason for the lawyer to seek 
withdrawal. Rule 1.16 (a)(1) requires a lawyer to withdraw if "the representation 
will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct." [FN203] Under my 
approach the lawyer's moral beliefs will likely limit the actions the lawyer can 
take. Thus, he has a "personal interest" within the meaning of the rules governing 
conflicts of interest. [FN204] Having identified such a personal interest, the 
lawyer cannot continue with the representation unless he reasonably believes that he 
will still be able to provide competent representation and the client consents to 
the limited representation. [FN205]
  I will use the example of the tort defendant about to inherit a substantial sum of 
money to illustrate this point. Assume, consistent with step 1, the client after 
full and thorough counseling has chosen not to disclose. Also, assume the lawyer, 
after full analysis of steps 2 and 3, has concluded that silence in settlement 
negotiations is lawful. At this point, she may be confronted with a moral question. 
I use the term "may be confronted" because the participants in the continuing legal 
education seminars in which I have used this hypothetical resolved the values and 
fact questions quite differently.
  I generally start these sessions by giving a few more details than I have 
previously provided on the case: (1) The plaintiff was gravely injured while 
purchasing a used washing machine at the defendant's home. (2) She will likely not 
be able to return to work. (3) Her three children are dependent upon her for a 
substantial portion of their yearly income, and the family has no major assets or 
savings. (4) Her husband is a paper mill worker, with few transferable skills, whose 
plant recently closed. (5) The defendant has some colorable defenses. (6) There is 
no outward evidence of the defendant having significant income or assets. (7) 
Defendant within one month will be getting a multi-million dollar inheritance. (8) 
Defendant has suggested to the lawyer that he *459 would like to use some of the 
inheritance to fund services for homeless individuals.
  Based on these facts, a minority of the participants with whom I have spoken, 
[FN206] took absolutist positions, some on each side. One group argued that it is 
immoral not to reveal this information since the injured plaintiff and her family 
would be left destitute due to the defendant's negligence. While all in this group 
mentioned the ability of the defendant to pay damages, some cited the unearned 
nature of the defendant's newfound wealth as a factor in their decision. None felt 
the other proposed usage of the money was relevant.
  This group also looked to the value of candor since, even if there was no specific 
discussion of the ability of defendant to pay damages, they felt defendant's counsel 
had to know this would be a factor in plaintiff's thinking. Interestingly, two 
lawyers in this camp, without being familiar with William Simon's work on justice, 
suggested that failure to disclose in such a situation was wrong because it would 
undercut the major values of the tort system, which are deterrence, compensation, 
and equitable dispute resolution.
  As one would expect, the second group argued that unless the plaintiff's lawyer 
specifically asked about ability to pay or the defendant's lawyer in some way misled 
the plaintiff, there was no moral or legal issue for the lawyer. This group would 
let their clients decide whether to disclose, without feeling any need to counsel 
the client about the plaintiff's situation and the equities. Their decision was 
based upon a strong belief in client confidentiality, the duty of "zeal," and 
allegiance to the adversary system. As one lawyer put it, "I would sleep soundly 
after the settlement knowing I well served my client, though it might not be the 
sleep of angels." It is interesting that no one based their position on the 
defendant's "charitable plan."
  A significant majority of the lawyers involved in these sessions identified a much 
more complex problem. They asked questions designed to determine the underlying 
facts of the incident, the ability of the plaintiff's lawyer to find out this 
information on his own, the overall level of cooperation of each party in the 
proceeding, and the details of the statements made in the negotiation.
  It is useful to examine why these four were the important factors for 
participants. First, the lawyers were interested in the merits since whether the 
*460 lower settlement amount was "unjust" in their eyes depended upon the actual 
value of the case. The question of whether the unknown facts rendered the process of 
settlement defective did not loom large for this group. Unless the settlement was 
inadequate, few felt any need to consider disclosure, absent misleading statements.
  Second, the participants looked to the ability of plaintiff's lawyer to find out 
the facts since many felt that if the adversary system provided any basis for the 
party to protect herself, this was the best option. [FN207] Since most in this group 
viewed the adversary process favorably and were grappling only with its limits, this 
is not surprising. Much of the conversation turned on discovery and informal factual 
investigation issues.
  I initially was surprised at how great a factor the cooperation of opposing 
counsel was. I wondered how the conduct of the plaintiff's lawyer affects the 
justice the settlement would provide to the plaintiff herself. Professor Freedman 
has argued that this factor can be highly relevant using the case of a divorce 
lawyer for a husband with funds who seeks to withhold as much information as 
possible from the less affluent wife. [FN208] Freedman points out that if the wife's 
lawyer is a "bomber," disclosure may prompt escalation of the already unfairly high 
demands. [FN209] Whether one agrees with this position, it was clear that for many 
of the participants, and especially the trial lawyers in the groups, this was a key 
factor in the overall moral calculus. Being fair was a consideration, but not if 
such a gesture would be met without reciprocity.
  The final factor, the nature of the disclosures made in the settlement talks, 
related mostly to the legal issues previously discussed. There was significant 
concern on the part of these lawyers about their reputations for honesty. This 
analysis is consistent with prior empirical research, which found that lawyers *461
were concerned about "duties to other professionals, and in particular opposing 
counsel." [FN210]
  After discussion of these factual questions, the participants in all sessions 
attempted to determine if the proposed action, to not disclose relevant information, 
was immoral. There was a great deal of disagreement among the participants on this 
question based on differences in their beliefs on what limits were appropriate on 
the adversary system.
  For those who determined that nondisclosure was inconsistent with their moral 
standards, the question remained whether their belief was significant enough that 
they felt compelled to do something. Some concluded that they could not in good 
conscience help the defendant. These lawyers felt limited in their representation 
either by their inability to complete the settlement under the agreed upon terms or 
by their inability to adequately counsel a client with whom they had such 
fundamental disagreements. Others, though uncomfortable with the result, felt that 
after weighing all the facts they could defer to the client's decision.
  For those who found that they could not follow the client's wishes, most saw 
threatening or seeking to withdraw as the best option. They seemed to understand the 
power of this step. None proposed the more extreme action to "sabotage" the client's 
plans by disclosing over the client's objection. [FN211]
  Given my argument that withdrawal is the most extreme action for a morally 
conflicted lawyer, one further point must be considered. What if the withdrawal is 
unsuccessful? There may be situations in litigation when approval of a tribunal is 
required and may be withheld. [FN212] In such situations, "regardless of the reason 
for seeking to withdraw as counsel, and regardless of whether the withdrawal is 
mandatoryor permissive, a lawyer is required to continue the representation if so 
ordered by a court." [FN213] Despite the moral dilemma this creates for the lawyer, 
the legal and ethical principles governing the practice of law require the lawyer to 
honor his or her commitment to the client.
*462 V. Conclusion
  One of my goals was to describe an approach that would demystify for practitioners 
the academic literature on lawyers' moral responsibility. I came to this project 
with some trepidation since the legal literature on this point is thoughtful, 
provocative, and something that should be considered by all lawyers. Yet, I do not 
see the debate percolating down effectively to those in the practicing bar. More 
importantly, I do not see the culture in most practice settings encouraging lawyers 
to explore their own moral beliefs, especially when the result is contrary to the 
interests of a firm's more powerful clients.
  I sought also to analyze whether more effective client counseling and a fuller 
understanding of the constraints placed on lawyers by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and other sources of law would decrease the incidence of moral conflict. I 
conclude such steps have had a significant impact, [FN214] but the potential for 
moral conflict continues to be present.
  I join the call for duly appointed or elected lawmakers to broaden the situations 
in which the law holds lawyers accountable for harm to third parties. [FN215] 
"Expansion of [these legal] duties, while no doubt complicated by the sustaining 
original obligation to one's client, would have the salutary effect of overcoming 
the persistent tendency of lawyers to support, genuinely and in good faith, the 
positions of their client, even in the face of apparent injustice to others." 
[FN216] Using democratic institutions to further substantive justice, rather than 
relying on individual lawyer's notions of morality seems to me to be more fair to 
lawyers and clients and more principled for society at large.
  I began my research hoping my four-step approach would better enable lawyers to 
address the moral issues they confront. Knowing the defined area in *463 which one's 
morals impact decisions in practice should reduce some of the uncertainty lawyers 
often feel in practice. Reducing uncertainty and discomfort should increase 
satisfaction with practice. I think this may be enough for many lawyers.
  However, given the increasing pressures in modern practice, others will return for 
alumni weekends wearing that look of despair all too familiar to those of us who 
teach Professional Responsibility. My reflection on this issue has caused me to 
rethink how I counsel my students. While I will still teach the limits on and 
possibilities for lawyer action, I also plan to help my students look at what 
practice options and law-related careers will best match both their aspirations and 
belief system. [FN217]
  I think choosing a professional setting that comports with one's moral beliefs, is 
the most effective way to be satisfied in practice. Academics should not give up 
their battle to enhance moral reasoning in practice. However, for those entering the 
work world, the ability to live one's ideals can only happen in a setting, be it a 
firm, public practice, or other professional arena, that operates in a manner 
consistent with one's values. [FN218]
[FNa1]. Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center. I am grateful to Dean John 
Hutson for his encouragement and financial support and to Andrew Matisziw and Barry 
Shanks for their research assistance. Thanks also to my faculty colleagues who read 
multiple drafts of my article and provided helpful and often pointed critiques: 
Richard Hesse, Kimberly Kirkland and Chris Johnson. Special thanks to Susan Covert 
for her invaluable editorial assistance.
[FN1]. This topic was the focus of the Professional Responsibility Section panel at 
the annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools in Washington, D.C. on 
January 4, 2003. The papers on which that discussion was based have been compiled 
and published in Symposium, Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 591 (2003). The articles in the Symposium, written by leaders of the major 
schools of thought in the area, constitute a wonderful primer. Given the clarity and 
accessibility of these materials, I will cite liberally to this source. Readers 
seeking greater depth and background on this issue can find a fuller annotation of 
the literature in the articles themselves.
[FN2]. See, e.g., "[Significant reform in regulation of the profession must be 
taken] to change a legal culture that is almost comically at odds with the 
profession's pompous self-image. [M]any of the most highly paid corporate attorneys 
in America all but ignore the spirit of tax, corporate, and securities laws. 
Instead, they are often linguistic Houdinis who specialize in hypertechnical 
arguments as to why their client's rat poison meets the five-part test for being 
apple pie." Mike France, Close the Lawyer Loophole, Bus. Wk., Feb. 2, 2004, at 70.
[FN3]. Since a Professional Responsibility course is required by the ABA for 
accreditation and virtually all Professional Responsibility texts provide some 
coverage of this scholarship, most law students likely have been exposed to the 
debate. See e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Susan P. Koniak, Roger C. Cramton, The 
Law and Ethics of Lawyering 20-39 (3rd ed., Foundation Press 1999); Nathan M. 
Crystal, Professional Responsibility: Problems of Practice and the Profession 21-26 
(3rd ed., Aspen Publishers 2004).
[FN4]. See Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in 
Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 837, 838 (1998). In 1995, the ABA's Section 
on Litigation convened a task force of socio-legal scholars to study if large firm 
lawyers considered "ethics beyond the rules." Over a series of months, the academics 
held focus groups with judges, large-firm litigators, plaintiffs' lawyers, and in-
house counsel. Id. at 838. One researcher noted that the litigators, when asked 
about conduct beyond that required by the ethical rules: 
[S]pent the bulk of their time talking about duties to other professionals, 
and in particular, to opposing counsel. At times, discussions also touched on duties 
to clients and duties to the legal system. Duties to third-party nonprofessionals 
and duties to the general welfare, however, received virtually no attention from 
these informants. 
    Id. at 846.
[FN5]. See Michael J. Kelly, Lives of Lawyers 2-4 (U. of Mich. Press 1996); Kimberly 
Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: the Principle of Pragmatism, U. Mem., L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2005)(manuscript pp.1-3, on file with the author).
[FN6]. See Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the 
SEC, in Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their Implications 834 (Nancy B. Rapoport & 
Bala G. Dharan eds., Foundation Press 2004).
[FN7]. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Three Approaches to Moral Issues in Law Office 
Counseling, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 591, 592 (2003).
[FN8]. Id. at 593. Cochran also describes the collaborative approach, which 
predictably takes the middle ground and asserts that the lawyer should be an 
aggressive and full partner with the client in resolving the moral questions 
presented in client representation. Under this model as in the client-centered 
model, the client retains the final say on the legal action. However, the 
collaborative approach rejects the notion, found in some client-centered writing, 
that the lawyer should remain neutral and detached. Id. at 598.
[FN9]. Id. at 596.
[FN10]. Id.
[FN11]. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Counseling, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 591, 604 (2003).
[FN12]. Id. at 616.
[FN13]. See Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Interviewing, Counseling, and 
Negotiating 26-27 (Aspen 1990);
[FN14]. Crystal, supra note 3 at 21.
[FN15]. Id.
[FN16]. Id.
[FN17]. Cochran, supra note 7, at 597.
[FN18]. Crystal, supra note 3, at 22.
[FN19]. Cochran, supra note 7, at 592; See also Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
[FN20]. Cochran, supra note 7, at 594.
[FN21]. See id. at 594-96.
[FN22]. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 174 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1988).
[FN23]. Paul R. Tremblay, Client-Centered Counseling and Moral Activism, 30 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 591, 618 (2003).
[FN24]. Id.
[FN25]. Cochran, supra note 7, at 596.
[FN26]. William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1998).
[FN27]. Id. at 138.
[FN28]. Id. at 50.
[FN29]. Cochran, supra note 7, at 594 n.13.
[FN30]. David Luban, a leading Contextualist scholar, presents a case, based on 
Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957), in which a rich man who owes a debt 
to a low-income person has a legally valid statute of limitations defense. Luban, 
supra note 22 at 47-48. Luban argues that raising the defense would lead to an 
immoral result. Id. He further argues that a lawyer faced with a conflict between a 
settled moral principle, such as that one who is able to should repay his debts, and 
the technical and unfair use of the law urged by the client, should decline to 
assist the client. See id. at 155.
[FN31]. Professor Simon uses the example from the prior footnote, but argues that it 
is the need to respect the statute, not general notions of morality that compel the 
lawyer not to assert the defense. Simon notes that there are two possible principles 
underlying the statute: repose or preventing use of evidence made unreliable by the 
passage of time. He argues, if the lawyer reasonably believes the latter is the 
proper purpose behind the statute, he or she should not plead the defense because 
"[f]or whatever difficulty the courts might have in determining this type of claim, 
there is no difficulty for the lawyer in determining the merits of this particular 
claim once the client has admitted the validity of the debt."(emphasis in the 
original). Simon, supra note 26, at 33. Given the fact that in this example there is 
no textual or other reason given why repose is not an equal or at least valid 
purpose behind the statute, this analysis seems to lend some support to Cochran's 
criticism of Simon's view, which is that it will "cloak the lawyer's moral judgment 
in legal jargon, giving it the authority of law." Cochran, supra note 7, at 594 
n.13.
[FN32]. Cochran, supra note 7, at 595.
[FN33]. See Kirkland, supra note 5, at 28; Simon, supra note 26, at 165.
[FN34]. See Cochran, supra note 7, at 598. 
In those cases in which the lawyer represents a poor client against a rich 
opponent, there is probably little need for the poor client to worry about the 
interests of the rich opponent-the rich opponent will have plenty of lawyers to look 
out for his interests. But when the lawyer represents the wealthy client against an 
(often unrepresented) poor party, the lawyer's exclusive focus on client autonomy is 
likely to result in injustice. 
    Id.
[FN35]. See Suchman, supra note 4, at 846; see also Robert Pack, Dilemmas in 
Attorney-Client Confidentiality, Washington Lawyer 23 at 44 (January 2004) (quoting 
Professor David Wilkins: "In the modern competitive, cut-throat marketplace for 
legal services, the presumption that the lawyers are able to say no to the clients 
and have power over the clients no longer applies in the context of large 
multinational corporations.").
[FN36]. See Rhode, supra note 11, at 612-13.
[FN37]. This approach will not be applicable to those without an identifiable client 
to whom some deference is owed. For example, prosecutors have the "responsibility of 
a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate." ABA Model Rules of Prof'l 
Conduct R. 3.8 (2003) [hereinafter Model Rules].
[FN38]. Under my approach, counseling the client about moral issues, as opposed to 
taking action based on a conflict between client wishes and lawyer values, need not 
wait until the final step. See infra sections IV A and IV D 2; see also Model Rules 
R. 2.1 (2003).
[FN39]. See generally Bastress & Harbaugh, supra note 13; Roger S. Haydock & Peter 
B. Knapp, Lawyering: Practice and Planning (2d ed., West 2003).
[FN40]. See Bastress and Harbaugh, supra note 13, at 237.
[FN41]. See Haydock, supra note 39, at 92.
[FN42]. Getting parties to focus on interests rather than on positions is a 
fundamental aspect of successful mediation. Interests are defined as something that 
is truly important to one of the parties. Examples of interests are financial well-
being or maintaining privacy. Positions on the other hand are described as solutions 
to specific grievances. Wanting $10,000 to settle a lawsuit is a position. Jennifer 
E. Beer, The Mediator's Handbook (3rd ed., New Society Publishers 1997).
[FN43]. David A. Binder, Paul Bergman, Susan C. Price, Paul R. Tremblay, Lawyers as 
Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach 302 (2nd ed., West 2004).
[FN44]. See Bastress and Harbaugh, supra note 13, at 61-62.
[FN45]. Id. at 239.
[FN46]. Id; see also Haydock & Knapp, supra note 39, at 87-90.
[FN47]. Richard Wasserman, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum. Rts. 
1,16 (1975) ("The lawyer can both be overly concerned with the interest of the 
client and at the same time fail to view the client as a whole person entitled to be 
treated certain ways.").
[FN48]. I have chosen this example, that of an uninsured tort defendant, to avoid 
the relational complexities imposed when an insurance company retains a defense 
lawyer to represent a defendant. This situation, often called the insurance 
triangle, is described in Public Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 
N.E.2d 810 (N.Y. 1981).
[FN49]. Whether the client or the lawyer (in consultation with the client) will be 
the ultimate decision maker on a specific decision is governed by ABA Model Rules 
1.2 and 1.4. Rule 1.2 is less than clear and sets up a somewhat unhelpful dichotomy 
between objectives, which are client decisions, and the means by which they are 
pursued. See Model Rules R. 1.2(a) (2003). Comment 1, though, makes clear that the 
client has "the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal 
representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional 
obligations." Id. at cmt. 1. The Restatement has adopted the "view that the client 
defines the goals of the representation and the lawyer implements them." Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, ch. 2 topic 3, (2000)[hereinafter cited solely 
as "Restatement"].
[FN50]. See, e.g., State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Addison, 412 N.W.2d 855 
(Neb. 1987) (finding a lawyer's failure to disclose that the defendant had an excess 
coverage insurance policy of which the plaintiff was unaware to be a violation of 
the disciplinary rules).
[FN51]. See, e.g., Brown v. County of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(declining to overturn a settlement without misrepresentation or fraudulent 
conduct).
[FN52]. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice 
Got To Do With It, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 787, 815 (2001); see also Bastress and Harbaugh, 
supra note 13, at 239.
[FN53]. See Model Rules R. 2.1 cmt. 2 ("Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be 
of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost 
or effects on other people, are predominant").
[FN54]. The rules governing lawyer conduct vary from state to state and are 
generally set by the highest court of each state, sometimes in conjunction with the 
bar association and the legislature. Federal Courts have the power to adopt their 
own sets of rules, and generally follow the rules of the state in which they sit. 
Despite the promulgation of model rules and codes by the American Bar Association 
beginning in 1908, states vary significantly in the rules they have adopted. Charles 
W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 50 (West 1986). In order to use a manageable set of 
rules for this article, I will rely on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
as amended through August 2003. For a concise overview of the sources of the law 
regulating lawyers see Restatement ß  1 (2000).
[FN55]. Model Rule 8.4(a) provides that it is "professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct." Model Rules R. 
8.4(a). 
  While a lawyer may "discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of 
conduct" and "may counsel and assist a client to determine the validity, scope, 
meaning or application of the law," the lawyer may not assist a client with conduct 
the lawyers knows is criminal or fraudulent. Model Rules R. 1.2(d).
[FN56]. Model Rule 4.1(a) states that a lawyer, in the course of representing a 
client, "shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a 
third person." Model Rules R. 4.1(a).
[FN57]. The question of whether any such withdrawal must be accompanied by a 
disavowal of certain prior representation, known as a noisy withdrawal, is a matter 
of some dispute. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsbility, Formal Op. 366 
(1992) (Holding, in a sharply divided opinion, that if a lawyer's withdrawal from 
further representation is insufficient to prevent the client from using the lawyer's 
work product to accomplish an unlawful purpose "disavowal of her opinion may be the 
only way of making her withdrawal effective.").
[FN58]. Some have suggested that the change in 1983 to the "black-letter rule" 
format of the Model Rules from the more aspirational Model Code has made the rules 
less of an independent moral force. The changes certainly were motivated, in part, 
by the desire for a more targeted and precise system of lawyer discipline, with less 
reliance on ambiguous prohibitions, such as old Canon 9's mandate that lawyers avoid 
"the appearance of impropriety." See generally Restatement ß  5 cmt. c. But see 
Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 8-10 (2d ed., 
LexisNexis 2002) (arguing that change to the Model Rules improperly undercut the 
lawyer's duty to his or her client and imported duties to those outside the 
relationship).
[FN59]. See Model Rules, Pmbl. •  8.
[FN60]. For purposes of this section, I will assume that the client does not intend 
to commit a fraud and use the lawyer's services in accomplishing the fraud. Under 
those facts, Model Rule 4.1 (b) would require disclosure if necessary to avoid 
assisting in a fraudulent act by the client, unless prohibited by Rule 1.6, which 
addresses confidentiality. This question was always a complex one. In August 2003, 
the ABA adopted changes to Rule 1.6, which permit much broader disclosure of client 
fraud if the lawyer's services were used and therefore alter the 4.1(b) analysis. In 
light of this, I will leave that topic for another article. Note also, that in such 
a situation Rule 1.2 (d) would bar the lawyer from assisting the client in this act, 
but the text of that rule does not require the affirmative disclosure that might now 
be required by Rule 4.1 (b). See also footnote 50.
[FN61]. Model Rules R. 4.1 cmt. 1. The ABA added this language in 2002 to clarify 
the vague language in the previous comment. The pre-2002 comment one stated that 
"[m]isrepresentations can also occur by failure to act." The current comment states 
  "[m]isrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements 
or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements." See also ABA 
Report to the House of Delegates, No. 401 (Feb. 2002); Model Rules R. 4.1, 
Reporter's Explanation of Changes.
[FN62]. Id.
[FN63]. See ABA Ann. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct 411 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
Ann. Model Rules].
[FN64]. Id.
[FN65]. 412 N.W.2d at 856 (Neb. 1987) (decided under DR 7-102(A)(5), which is 
virtually identical to Model Rule 4.1(a)).
[FN66]. Id.
[FN67]. Id. at 856. For a factually similar case finding the attorney liable for 
fraud, see Slotkin v. Citizens Casualty of New York, 614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1980).
[FN68]. See Model Rules R. 1.6.
[FN69]. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsbility, Formal Op. 387 (1994).
[FN70]. Id.
[FN71]. See Model Rules R. 1.6.
[FN72]. 212 F.Supp.2d 435 (D. Md. 2002).
[FN73]. Id. at 450-51.
[FN74]. Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics 609-610 
(6th ed., Aspen 2002).
[FN75]. Koniak, supra note 6, at 847.
[FN76]. See generally annotations following Rule 8.4 in Ann. Model Rules, supra note 
56, at 189-90.
[FN77]. Model Rules R. 8.4 (c).
[FN78]. See In re Conduct of Gallagher, 26 P.3d 131 (Or. 2001) (holding lawyer had a 
duty under 8.4(c) not to disburse a check he knew was incorrectly drawn by the 
opposing party); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsbility, Informal Op. 1518 
(1986) (ruling that counsel must notify opposing counsel of inadvertent omission of 
contract provision).
[FN79]. Restatement ß 5 cmt. c.
[FN80]. Id.
[FN81]. Id.
[FN82]. There is language in some cases suggesting a stricter standard. The Fourth 
Circuit said, "the system can provide no harbor for clever devices to divert the 
search, mislead opposing counsel, or cover up what is necessary for justice in the 
end. It is without note, therefore, that we recognize that the lawyer's duties to 
maintain the confidences of a client and advocate vigorously are trumped ultimately 
by a duty to guard against the corruption that justice will be dispensed on an act 
of deceit." United States v. Shaffer Equipment Co., 11 F.3d 450, 457-58 (4th Cir. 
1993) (dealing with the lawyer's duty of candor to the court under Rule 3.3).
[FN83]. See, e.g., Brown v. County of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(vacating the trial court's decision to modify a settlement agreement).
[FN84]. See, e.g., Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354 (N.J. 1995)  (holding 
seller's lawyer had duty to purchaser not to misrepresent the contents of a material 
document and awarding damages).
[FN85]. See, e.g., Childs v. Argenbright, 927 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. App. 1996) (upholding 
order imposing sanctions on attorney for pre-trial discovery abuses in divorce); 
United States v. Lundwall, 1 F.Supp.2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (refusing to dismiss an 
obstruction of justice indictment for conduct in a civil case).
[FN86]. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 
1389, 1410-15 (1992) (discussing the divergence of the "bar's law," meaning the 
ethical rules and the "state's law"); Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar 
Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. Tex. L. 
Rev. 639, 643-45 (1994).
[FN87]. See Symposium, The Lawyers Duties and Liabilities to Third Parties, 37 S. 
Tex. L. Rev. 957 (1996).
[FN88]. Restatement ß  51 cmt. b.
[FN89]. See Restatement ß  56 cmt. f.
[FN90]. Id.
[FN91]. Id.
[FN92]. Id. at cmt. c.
[FN93]. Id. at ß  51 (1)-(4).
[FN94]. Id.
[FN95]. There is one substantial limitation on the scope of this theory. The text of 
the section limits liability if the nonclient, under state law, is "too remote from 
the lawyer to be entitled to protection." Id. at ß  51(2)(b). This will be 
determined by looking at whether the state has: 1) Rejected any duty to members of a 
class of unknown recipients, as in Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 559 
N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); 2) Adopted a limited duty to the persons who 
were intended to benefit from the work, as does the Restatement (Second) of Torts ß  
552; or 3) Adopted a duty to those who the lawyer should have foreseen would rely on 
the opinion, as in Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th 
Cir.1991).
[FN96]. 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043  (1988); See also 
cases cited in Reporter's Note to Restatement ß  51 cmt. c.
[FN97]. Greycas, 826 F.2d at 1562.
[FN98]. Id. at 1561-62.
[FN99]. Id. at 1564.
[FN100]. Id. at 1564-65.
[FN101]. While I was preparing this article, I received the Current Report section 
of the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct (Volume 20, No.3 2/11/2004). 
Of the twelve cases discussed in that edition, five addressed liability to 
nonclients.
[FN102]. Restatement ß  56 cmt. b.
[FN103]. See, e.g., McKinnon v. Tibbetts, 440 A.2d 1028 (Me. 1982)  (holding lawyer 
liable for falsely claiming to be pursuing client's case).
[FN104]. See, e.g., Chase Manhatten Bank v. Perla, 411 N.Y.S.2d 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1978) (finding lawyer liable if he made false assertions about distributions of 
proceeds from house sale).
[FN105]. 693 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
[FN106]. Id.
[FN107]. 397 P.2d 787 (Or. 1964).
[FN108]. Jeska, 693 P.2d at 1337 (citations omitted).
[FN109]. Restatement (Second) of Torts ß  529, cited in Restatement ß  98 cmt. b, 
reporter's notes.
[FN110]. See Ausherman, 212 F.Supp. at 451.
[FN111]. See ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (1992), available 
at http://abanet.org/cpr/mckay_report.html.
[FN112]. See, e.g., Freedman & smith, supra note 58, at App. B. For an interesting 
treatment of a related example, see the discussion among experts for various law 
schools and several experienced practitioners which centered on whether a lawyer 
could take advantage of a crucial tactical error made by an opponent in a divorce 
action. Much of the practitioner's reasoning recounted on these pages turned on the 
question of whether the action would amount to fraud, and whether the resulting 
decree should have been set aside. See id. at B-391-93. Contrast that with the 
observation of a nationally known ethics professor that he "would alert the other 
lawyer [despite not believing this to be fraud] because that's where my values are." 
Id. at B-394-95.
[FN113]. Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, in Corporate 
Fiascos, supra note 6, at 650.
[FN114]. In order to make this topic manageable, I have not analyzed other torts, 
such as intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Restatement ß 56 cmt. g, 
which contains an effective overview of the cases. Though this tort, like others 
seeking damages for emotional harm, is not recognized in all jurisdictions and has a 
high burden of proof for the plaintiff, there are cases listed in the annotation 
finding lawyer's conduct to have violated the law. Similarly, Restatement ß  57 cmt. 
d discusses wrongful use of civil proceedings.
[FN115]. See generally Restatement ß  56 cmt. j.
[FN116]. Richard A. Hesse and Mitchell M. Simon, Serving the Needs of Both the 
Consumer of Legal Services and the Profession Through the Application of Consumer 
Protection Statutes to Lawyers, 3 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 116, 122-23 (1991).
[FN117]. Restatement ß  56 cmt. j.
[FN118]. See Hesse and Simon, supra note 116.
[FN119]. See, e.g., Brown v. Gerstein, 460 N.E.2d 1043 (Mass. App. Ct.), writ 
denied, 464 N.E.2d 73 (Mass. 1984) (including professional services in the meaning 
of "trade or commerce"); Banks v. D.C. Dept. of Consumer Regulatory Affairs, 634 
A.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
[FN120]. See, e.g., Jamgochian v. Prousalis, 2000 WL 1610750 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000) 
(implying a "learned professional" exemption); Frahm v. Urkovich, 447 N.E.2d 1007 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (excluding the practice of law from the statute's definition of 
"trade or commerce"); Vort v. Hollander, 607 A.2d 1339 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), 
cert. denied 617 A.2d 1221 (N.J. 1992) (granting a "learned professional" 
exemption); Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142, 
1151 (Cal. 1994) (acknowledging that the California Supreme Court has absolute 
authority in controlling lawyers).
[FN121]. See, e.g., Suffield Dev. Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Loan Investors L.P., 
802 A.2d 44 (Conn. 2002) (holding only entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of 
law are covered); Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So.2d 1067 (La. Ct. App. 1979) 
(including legal advertising within the meaning of "trade or commerce"); Short v. 
Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1984) (entrepreneurial aspects of law fall within the 
CPA); DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (finding that statute 
has "learned professional" exemption, but allowing consumers to proceed for 
misrepresentation and unconscionable acts).
[FN122]. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ß  358-A:2 (2003).
[FN123]. 519 A.2d 243 (N.H. 1986), rehearing denied, 529 A.2d 862 (N.H. 1987).
[FN124]. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ß  358-A:3(I) (2003).
[FN125]. Rousseau, 519 A.2d at 245.
[FN126]. Id.
[FN127]. Id.
[FN128]. Id. at 246-47.
[FN129]. Id. at 247. See also Eriks v. Denver, 824 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1992) (finding 
failure to disclose conflict only actionable if for business purposes, such as 
increasing profit from the case); Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz and Schatz, 
717 A.2d 724 (Conn. 1998) (holding no CPA claim due to a law firm's negligent 
conduct).
[FN130]. Rousseau, 519 A.2d at 247-52.
[FN131]. See Rousseau v. Eshleman, 529 A.2d 862 (N.H. 1987).
[FN132]. Id. at 865.
[FN133]. Gilmore v. Bradgate, 604 A.2d 555, 557 (N.H. 1992) (holding that the 
"reasoning behind the Rousseau decision, if relevant at all, is applicable only 
within the context of attorneys, whose individual conduct and practice is subject to 
a comprehensive regulatory and disciplinary framework under the jurisdiction of this 
court.").
[FN134]. Averill v.Cox, 761 A.2d 1083 (N.H. 2000).
[FN135]. Id. at 1087.
[FN136]. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ß  358-A:3 (2003). It is interesting that the 
Legislature in its zeal to insure lawyers were subject to CPA actions, included all 
professionals. It exempted only select industries, including insurers and security 
dealers. There is still debate about whether lawyers are covered only for actions in 
the business of law, rather than actions in the actual practice since that portion 
of the ruling was based on a different section of the statute.
[FN137]. See, e.g., Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995)(holding Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act applies to lawyers who regularly, though litigation, 
collect consumer debts); Duncan v. Handmaker, 149 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 
1998)(addressing coverage under Fair Credit Reporting Act).
[FN138]. But see Santa Clara Co., 869 P.2d at 1151 (reaffirming the California 
Supreme Court has absolute authority in controlling lawyers).
[FN139]. See Restatement ß  105, introductory note.
[FN140]. U.S. v. Proctor and Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
[FN141]. See generally Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under FRCP 26(a) - "Much 
Ado About Nothing?" 46 Hastings L.J. 679 (1995).
[FN142]. Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: 
Institutional, Professional, and Socio-economic Factors That Contribute to 
Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham 
L. Rev. 773, 790 (1998).
[FN143]. Id.
[FN144]. Id. at 794-95 ("For judges, discovery disputes are an annoyance on which 
they spend relatively little time and are best dealt with by jawboning and case 
management rather than sanctions") Id. at 794..
[FN145]. See Restatement ß  110 cmts. e and g, reporter's notes.
[FN146]. Nelson, supra note 142, at 797.
[FN147]. Id.
[FN148]. Id.
[FN149]. 156 F.3d 255 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1039  (1999).
[FN150]. Id. at 257.
[FN151]. Id. at 260-61.
[FN152]. Id. at 261.
[FN153]. Id. at 272.
[FN154]. Id. at 276. The Court of Appeals held that the reason for the reversal was 
the trial judge's incorrect legal ruling that this letter need not have been 
disclosed as within the impeachment exception to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3), rather 
than any arbitrary refusal by the judge to require compliance with the pretrial 
order.
[FN155]. Id. at 271.
[FN156]. Id.
[FN157]. I have only analyzed in this section a sample of the potential external 
sources of control of lawyer conduct. It would take much more space and time than I 
have to survey fully all such sources of law. However, there is one additional 
source of law that should be mentioned in the discovery context because of the 
severe consequences for its violation - i.e., criminal law. For example, a lawyer 
considering whether to destroy documents needs to consider obstruction of justice 
and similar statutes. See Restatement ß  118 cmt. c. In addition to criminal 
sanctions, document destruction can lead to a "spoliation" claim, contempt of court, 
and imposition of an unfavorable evidentiary inference. Id.; See also Nelson, supra 
note 142, at 788 (Destruction or failure to disclose documents "can create huge 
problems for a client later in the litigation[and] "can do more damage to a client's 
case than the documents themselves.").
[FN158]. One might consider this analogous to the principle of constitutional 
adjudication that one should not reach a constitutional question unless "absolutely 
necessary." Burton v. U.S., 196 U.S. 283, 293 (1905). I recognize that some may see. 
this analogy as seriously flawed believing that ethical analysis should be in the 
forefront of legal thinking. See Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interest of Justice: 
Reforming the Legal Profession 67 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (arguing that attorneys 
should "act on the basis of their own principled convictions, even when they 
recognize that others in good faith hold different views").
[FN159]. Although some states may have different rules, the general rule is that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to discovery of a defendant's assets until judgment is 
issued. The theory behind this rule is that the economic status of the defendant is 
not yet relevant. See e.g., Sawyer v. Boufford, 312 A.2d 693 (N.H. 1973); 23 Am. 
Jur. 2d Depositions and Discovery ß  40 (1983). If attachment of assets is sought, 
some of this information may be discoverable.
[FN160]. See, e.g., Model Rules R. 1.6 cmt. 12 (limiting the scope of disclosure to 
only that necessary when a lawyer chooses to reveal client confidences as authorized 
by the rule).
[FN161]. See Model Rule R. 1.4. See also Model Rule R. 1.7 cmt. 8 ("The critical 
questions are the likelihood that a difference in interest will eventuate and, if it 
does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent 
professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action 
that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.").
[FN162]. See generally Rhode, supra note 113.
[FN163]. See generally Freedman & Smith, supra note 58 (arguing that the lawyer has 
the moral choice as to whom he represents, but that once the representation is 
undertaken the client is entitled to make the important decisions).
[FN164]. There is an underlying question as to whether one believes that, when 
fulfilling the lawyer's special role within the legal system, lawyers should be 
bound, as much as possible, by the same moral rules that generally apply to others 
in society. The notion that lawyers are not governed by principles of common 
morality, but only by the specialized rules of the profession, is called "role 
morality" and is supported by many provisions of the ABA's Model Code and Rules. For 
example, as demonstrated in section IV (B), our rules of ethics permit, and may 
indeed mandate, actions that many would find to violate the common duty of honesty 
and fairness. See. id. at 10, but see Luban, supra note 22, at 104 (questioning how 
"being admitted to the bar and taking a retainer [can] turn wrong into right").
[FN165]. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism 
Crusade, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 259, 303 (1995) (criticizing as "demonstrably 
erroneous[the] premise that conscientious lawyers agree on the way to be a good 
person and a good lawyer, or that a single kind of lawyering is right and all others 
wrong").
[FN166]. Bradley Wendel has written that "Moral geometry, whether consequentialist 
or deontological, offers a significant advantage for practical reasoning.If Kant is 
right, we can never be faced with conflicting obligations only if we think carefully 
about which obligation can be derived from the categorical imperative. If law and 
economics theorists are right, we never do harm by doing good, because overall 
wealth maximization is always justified, provided the distribution of resources is 
optimal.The appeal of monisitic accounts of professional responsibility is therefore 
apparent." W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 113, 
140-41 (2000).
[FN167]. Id. at 212.
[FN168]. Id.
[FN169]. Id.
[FN170]. Paul R. Tremblay, Symposium: Teaching Values in Law Schools:  Shared Norms, 
Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry, 36 U.S.F.L. Rev. 659, 688-89 (2002).
[FN171]. Id. at 691-92.
[FN172]. Id. at 692.
[FN173]. Id. at 691.
[FN174]. Id. at 691-92.
[FN175]. See, e.g., Martin Benjamin, Between Subway and Spaceship: Practical Ethics 
at the Onset of the Twenty-first Century, 31 Hastings Center Rpt. 24 (2001).
[FN176]. Rhode, supra note 158, at 66-67.
[FN177]. Id. at 67.
[FN178]. Paul R. Tremblay, Client-Centered Counseling and Moral Activism, 30 Pepp. 
L. Rev. 591, 618 (2003).
[FN179]. Id. at 618-19.
[FN180]. One could argue that using this standard adds little to the lawyer's 
existing duties since in such a situation, the lawyer may not continue with the 
representation due to a conflict between the client's interests and the lawyer's own 
interests. See Model Rules R. 1.7. This analysis would consider the lawyer's moral 
beliefs to be external factors to be considered in the same manner as a financial 
interest.
[FN181]. Andrew L. Kaufman, A Commentary on Pepper, Am. B. Found. Res. J. 651 
(1986).
[FN182]. Though I have focused this article on lawyers with an existing client, it 
is worth looking briefly at whether the moral considerations are different prior to 
the acceptance of a client's case. Model Rule 1.2(b) makes clear that a lawyer's 
representation of a reprehensible client "does not constitute an endorsement of the 
client's views." While this rule is designed to encourage lawyers to represent all 
clients in need of representation, there is no mandate in the Model Rules to 
represent any specific client. See Model Rules R. 6.2 cmt. 1. In fact, Monroe 
Freedman, a leader of the client-centered school, believes lawyers are morally 
accountable for decisions to accept a particular client or cause. Freedman & Smith, 
supra note 58, at 87; but see Michael E. Tigar, Setting the Record Straight on the 
Defense of John Demjanjuk, Legal Times, September 6, 1993, reprinted in Freedman & 
smith, supra note 58, at 399-402.
[FN183]. Freedman & Smith, supra note 58, at 87.
[FN184]. Luban, supra note 22, at 174.
[FN185]. See Cochran, supra note 7, at 596 n.26, citing Bastress and Harbaugh, supra 
note 13, at 334-35; Binder et al., supra note 37, at 294-95.
[FN186]. See supra note 8 for a description of the collaborative approach.
[FN187]. Cochran, supra note 7, at 597 note 26, citing Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. 
Cochran, Jr., Lawyers, Clients and Moral Responsibility (1994).
[FN188]. Having urged a broad approach to assessing client interest and looked at 
the complex relationship between legal constraints and moral issues, I find myself 
in full agreement with Comment 2 to Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules. This section wisely 
refuses to draw too bright a line between moral concerns and legal issues. It 
provides that "[a]lthough a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical 
considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how 
the law will be applied." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (2002).
[FN189]. Adopting a collaborative approach merely encourages the lawyer and client 
to resolve moral issues together through moral discourse. The client makes the 
ultimate decision, but the lawyer is actively involved in the process. The Comments 
to the Model Rules provide that "[i]t is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant 
moral and ethical considerations in giving advice." Model Rules 2.1 cmt. 2 (2002).
[FN190]. Restatement ß  32 cmt. h (ii).
[FN191]. Id. at cmt. c.
[FN192]. See Model Rules R. 1.16.
[FN193]. Id.
[FN194]. Model Rules R. 1.16 (b)(1).
[FN195]. Model Rules R. 1.16 (b)(4).
[FN196]. Restatement ß  32 cmt. h (ii).
[FN197]. The Restatement seeks to limit this principle somewhat. It provides, based 
solely on fiduciary principles, without any case or rule citations, that "the lawyer 
may not withdraw when [there is]a significant disproportion between the detrimental 
effects that would be imposed on the client by the contemplated withdrawal as 
against detrimental effects that would be imposed on the lawyer." Id.
[FN198]. Model Rules R. 1.16 (b)(4).
[FN199]. Model Rules R. 1.16, cmt. b.
[FN200]. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16(b)(3) (pre 2002), reprinted in Thomas 
D. Morgan & Ronald Rotunda, 2003 Selected Standards on Professional Responsibility 
223 (Foundation Press 2003).
[FN201]. ABA Report of the House of Delegates, No. 401 (Feb. 2002); Model Rules R. 
1.16 (reporter's explanation of changes).
[FN202]. See, e.g., Red Dog v. State, 625 A.2d 245 (Del. 1993)  (authorizing lawyer 
for client who wished to accept the death penalty to seek to withdraw due to 
lawyer's beliefs on the death penalty).
[FN203]. Model Rules R. 1.16(a)(1).
[FN204]. See Model Rules R. 1.7(a)(2).
[FN205]. Model Rules R. 1.7(b)(1) and (4). See also Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 
825 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a district court is vested with broad power and 
responsibility to supervise the professional conduct of the attorneys appearing 
before it).
[FN206]. This data is based on several educational seminars I have conducted. The 
audiences ranged from lawyers just admitted to practice to members of large firms 
and public interest organizations. Unfortunately, at the time I conducted these 
sessions, I did not keep adequate records to use the results for in-depth empirical 
research.
[FN207]. William Simon has suggested that defects in the process are very relevant 
to the lawyer's role. He has written that: "[T]he more reliable the relevant 
procedures and institutions, the less direct responsibility the lawyer need assume 
for the substantive justice of the resolution; the less reliable the procedures and 
institutions, the more direct responsibility she needs to assume for substantive 
justice." Simon, supra note 26, at 140.
[FN208]. A Gathering of Legal Scholars to Discuss "Professional Responsibility and 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct," 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 639, 652 (1981), cited 
in Simon, supra note 26, at 141-42.
[FN209]. Id. at 652-53. Professor Simon has suggested that this may be a reason to 
delay disclosure as long as the case is disposed of "justly." Id.
[FN210]. Suchman, supra note 4, at 846.
[FN211]. See David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client 
Relationship: A Reply to Stephan Ellman, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004, 1036-41 (1990).
[FN212]. See Model Rules R. 1.16(c).
[FN213]. ABA Ann. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct 269 (5th ed. 2003); but see  State 
v. Jones, 923 P.2d 560 (Mont. 1996) (holding that while an attorney may not have 
agreed with his client's decision to decline what the attorney considered to be a 
favorable plea agreement, this does not constitute cause for withdrawal).
[FN214]. William Simon has written that: "The developments in professional 
regulation most compatible with the Contextualist view have been invariably 
undertaken by other institutions-courts, regulatory agencies and specialized bar 
associations. While the courts in their roles as ethical regulators have been 
inclined to adopt the national bar's codes more or less wholesale, they have taken 
different tacks in other contexts. In applying criminal and tort norms against fraud 
and assisting in illegal activities and in liberalizing the discovery system, 
several courts have enlarged (or rediscovered) lawyer duties to nonclients under 
relatively contextual norms." Simon, supra note 26, at 196.
[FN215]. See Rhode, supra note 11, at 614 ("The massive misconduct revealed in Enron 
et al. involved failures of counseling, but the solution is not simply better 
counseling education. Changes are needed in regulatory structures and reward 
systems. Lawyers, managers, accountants, and those who oversee them must be subject 
to greater accountability").
[FN216]. Tremblay, supra note 23, at 625-26.
[FN217]. See, e.g., Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical 
Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871 
(1999); Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate 
Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 
UMKC L. Rev. 239 (2000).
[FN218]. See generally Andrew M. Pearlman, A Career Choice Critique of Legal Ethics 
Theory, 51 Seton Hall L. Rev. 829 (2001).
